

DID SENIOR BRITISH OFFICERS
EFFECTIVELY LEAD CHANGE?

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General Studies

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

DID SENIOR BRITISH OFFICERS EFFECTIVELY LEAD CHANGE? by Major Gordon W. Muir, 149 pages.

There has been considerable change in the British Army over the last five years. Financial considerations were paramount as the British Army sought to transform and meet the future operating environment.

This thesis researched how the changes were perceived by majors who promoted in 2012. The research was mixed, and contained both a quantitative survey and qualitative interviews. The responses were transposed onto a civilian change model by Hal Rainey and Sergio Fernandez, to assess how well the changes were led in the British Army.

Three key areas were identified. First, the perception that the cohort felt they had little to no involvement or input into change. Second, the communication of change was not persuasive enough. Finally, that there was a perceived lack of a plan or how change was to be enacted. All these areas negatively affected the perception of change overall and how it was led.

Nevertheless, these observations and areas for improvement were always couched in a realistic appreciation of the environment in which change was carried out: non-conducive and constrained. Finally, and with potentially the most far-reaching repercussions for the future, there were also perceived negative affects caused by change on the British Army's culture.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The last five years has seen significant change in the British Army. A new structure is being implemented with two key tenets; the decrease by 20 percent of the Regular Army, and a new role for and expansion of the Reserves. However, this structural change is occurring within an even wider transformation. The change agenda is vast, incorporating personnel policy areas such as pensions and redundancies as well as wider force application issues and roles. In addition, this transformation was conducted, and continues to be, with operations ongoing in Afghanistan. A key driving factor behind these changes was the financial crisis of 2008 and the resulting severe fiscal constraints. Any discussion of the changes must be set against a context of these challenges. Nevertheless, the die has been cast. This *new* British Army must now meet the future operating environment.

Although the financial realities may have acted as a forcing function, this future operating environment, and the adoption of an “adaptable posture,”¹ as identified in the United Kingdom’s 2010 publication, *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review* (hereafter referred to as *Strategic Defence and Security Review*), has been highlighted on numerous occasions as a guiding consideration

¹ Prime Minister, *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review* (London: The Stationery Office Limited, October 2010), accessed 30 May 2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62482/strategic-defence-security-review.pdf. Hereafter referred to as *Strategic Defence and Security Review*.

to the changes.² The all-important context of change and how the *Strategic Defence and Security Review* set the parameters for the British Army's transformation will be the subject of chapter 2 and key documents outlining how the Army will look in 2020 and the role of Reserves will be discussed, serving as a backdrop to this thesis.

Furthermore, great change has not been limited to the United Kingdom. Western nations are entering a post-conflict, in all probability inter-war, era and many nations are using this current lull in ground force commitment as an opportune time to change their armies. This is both driven by fiscal pressures and the new strategic environment. The United States is a case in point. Their downsizing although continuing and on a fair broader scale than the United Kingdom is very similar in terms of percentages. They must also address how change is to be led.

Ultimately, the changes have affected everyone in the British Army and have not been without controversy. However, they may also offer great opportunity and potential benefits going forward.

Thesis Outline

The aim of this thesis is to examine how Senior British Army Officers led this change once imposed. The changes were undoubtedly complex, the environment in many ways non-conducive and they involved a significant amount of process and planning. The backdrop to the changes will be discussed in chapter 2 as well as three key areas of

² Ministry of Defence, *Army 2020* (London: National Audit Office, 11 June 2014), accessed 1 September 2014, <http://www.nao.org.uk/report/army-2020-2/>. "Irrespective of the financial imperatives facing the Army to play its part in bringing the Ministry of Defence's budget back into balance, strategic circumstances dictate that the Army needs to evolve so that it can face future threats effectively."

change: Army 2020, the future structure of the British Army; personnel policy, pension reform, and redundancies; and The New Employment Model. These programs were selected due to their impact on, and therefore importance to, the future of the British Army. However, the focus will be on how these changes were led.

Change leadership is a heavily discussed topic and for the purposes of this research, a model designed by Hal Rainey and Sergio Fernandez will be used. The model was selected due to several factors. First, the construct is similar to many others in the field of change management.³ Second, unlike many others in the field, it is specifically geared to public organizations and is non-linear in nature. The models and their applicability to this research are discussed in chapter 2. The secondary questions that will be addressed are:

1. What are the differences between public and private organizations, and is the British Army a special case?
2. What are the key considerations for the applicability of civilian change models with the British Army?
3. Why is the Rainey and Fernandez model relevant and do the changes in the British Army exhibit any of their key determinants for successful change?
4. What were the main areas of good and bad practice related to the change programs?
5. Was the situation (financial restraints and government directed) such that no opportunity existed to implement change the way Senior British Army officers desired?

³ For example Dr. Kotter's 8 Stage Change Process.

The focus of this thesis will be on the perception of the role of Senior British Army Leadership in initiating and leading the change. For this study, perception is an “impression: an attitude or understanding based on what is observed or thought.”⁴ The impressions which will be researched are those of majors who were selected for promotion in 2012. The primary research question will be: What is the perception of majors promoted in 2012 regarding the implementation of the British Army’s transformation by Senior British Army Officers?

This generation was selected for two reasons. First, the author belongs to this generation and naturally has a close affinity. This ensured ease of access and allowed interviewees to be more candid with a member of their own generation, eliminating rank from the equation. More importantly, it is also an interesting generation with a view to the change program. All joined in or before 2005, immediately prior to the British Army ramping up its presence in Afghanistan but while Iraq was ongoing. Therefore, they have experience of the Army before a period of considerable operational demands, combat experience with knowledge of how an army operates while carrying out its *raison d’être*, felt the effects of change directly, had to implement and directly lead the change, and most importantly, are now witnessing firsthand the realities of the transformation. They have experienced the entire journey of change and have come out the other side.

This is what makes the opinions of this cohort so relevant. They will operate in an army fundamentally different from the one they joined, and be the leaders who will run an army designed by officers who would have long since retired. Every year the Ministry

⁴ Oxford English Dictionary, “Perception,” Oxford University Press, accessed 18 April 2014, <http://www.oed.com/>.

of Defence conducts a quantitative study, *Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey*,⁵ which provides useful statistics and snapshots of positive and negative experiences. It is a useful overview across the services of prevailing attitudes; recorded and reported in percentages. Elements of this will be interwoven in this thesis. However, there has not been an in-depth qualitative study into the effects of the change program that focuses specifically on those who were responsible for leading the transformation.

The thesis will look at the perceived effects certain selected change programs had on the British Army, any demographic differences, evidence of good or bad practice, and above all, how the implementation of British Army transformation was led by Senior Leaders. The aim will be to identify and outline how the Army went about change, how it was perceived by majors who were promoted in 2012 and what, if any, lessons can be gleaned from the last five years of transition.

Definition of Terms

There are numerous definitions of leadership available. For the purposes of this thesis, the following definition will be used from *Developing Leaders: A Sandhurst Guide*, by The Royal Military Academy:

“Effective leadership in the British Army is characterised by the projection of personality and purpose onto people and situations in order to prevail in the most demanding circumstances. For this to be moral, just and acceptable it has to be

⁵ Defence Statistics (WDS), Statistical Series 6–Other, Bulletin 6.03, *Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey* (London: Ministry of Defence, 21 May 2014), accessed 20 August 2014, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/armed-forces-continuous-attitude-survey-2014>.

underpinned by moral values, which to be truly authentic, must be practised by all ranks.”⁶

This definition is particularly useful for this research. It is irrefutable that the circumstances faced by the Senior Leadership were demanding, and key to surmounting these was a clear and unequivocal purpose which, as it affected all of those in the Army, had to be led effectively and in a moral fashion. The British Army has three components of fighting power: conceptual, how to fight; physical, the means to fight; and moral, getting people to fight. This moral element is defined as having leaders who are “the cutting edge of the force, leading by example from the front, innovating and shaping values and behaviours to ensure that the force performs well, without moral blemish.”⁷ Any change to the Army must be led in a moral fashion or it risks alienating swathes of the Army, which in turn impacts upon the fighting prowess of the force itself. As Field Marshall Montgomery stated, “Man is still the first weapon of war.”⁸ The importance of people to the Army and the fact that they are a key resource is a point often highlighted by British Army leadership at all levels and particularly in a period of upheaval and change. This is especially germane to this thesis.

The level of leadership also varies. There is direct leadership, from the leader who is in Army parlance one-up which is one rank above the individual and has day-to-day

⁶ The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, *Developing Leaders: A Sandhurst Guide, Pilot version* (Surrey: Crown, Easter 2012), accessed 25 April 2014, http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/rmas_developing_leaders.pdf.

⁷ Ibid., 4.

⁸ Ibid.

supervision responsibilities and then there is senior leadership, the executive.⁹ There is obviously an inherent relationship between the two. Executive decisions must be enforced and enacted by the direct leaders. However, in this thesis, although direct leadership will be part of the discussion—it is impossible to ignore it—the focus will be on the senior, executive level. The executive level is defined as a one-star, brigadier in the British Army, and above.

Scope and Limitations

There is inherent bias through being a part of the generation that was be studied. However, this was mitigated by two measures. First, broad quantitative research was conducted of the cohort to establish a baseline and consensus. Second, qualitative research of officers from different branches of the Army, and therefore experiences, was undertaken and these officers were interviewed to ensure as wide a reach as possible. The opinions of Senior British Leaders were also used, from both primary and secondary sources to counterbalance, triangulate, and provide insights into the change program and all-important context. The methodology and means of research will be examined in chapter 3, which outlines the plan for collection, presentation, and analysis of the data.

The study did not seek the views of younger or older generations of serving officers. In addition, the opinions of non-commissioned officers and soldiers, while

⁹ Joris van der Voet, MSc., Dr. Ben S. Kuipers, and Dr. Sandra Groeneveld, “Implementing Change in Public Organizations” (paper presented at the 11th Public Management Research Conference, Madison, Wisconsin, June 20-22, 2013), accessed 10 March 2014, <http://jorisvandervoet.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/van-der-voet-et-al-implementing-change-in-public-organizations-pmra.pdf>. In this paper, the different aspects of leadership in organizations is discussed. Van der Voet et al. focus on direct leadership, whereas in this thesis the focus is on executive leadership.

tremendously valid, is out of scope for this thesis. However, questions were asked of the officers interviewed about how the changes were perceived by those under their command, directly or indirectly.

Summary

Great change can lead to profound turmoil. The measures taken over the last five years have transformed the British Army and had a serious impact on the lives of those who serve. This thesis will examine bespoke areas of change, apply a civilian leadership and change model to the situation, examine how Senior British Leaders led the change, and assess how this was perceived by the generation of promoting majors in 2012.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The British Army has undergone a period of great change that is still continuing. This change affected every area of the Army, and two key tenets of this change has seen the Regular force decrease by 20 percent and the Reserves rebranded, expanded and handed new roles. This thesis will focus on how these and other selected changes were implemented by the Senior Leadership and the perception thereof by majors who were selected for promotion in 2012.

The critical context and background to the changes will be examined in the following pages. The thesis will analyze the situation facing the British Army as it sought to change. Subsequently, the key changes during this period will be highlighted. First, however, the organizational construct of the British Army as a public organization and the applicability of civilian change models will be examined. Rainey's and Fernandez's model will then be discussed, as well as a comparison to Dr. Kotter's 8 Stage Change Model, to illustrate its usefulness as the framework for investigating the British Army's transformation.

Differences between Public and Private Organizations

The majority of change models and transformation research is centered upon private organizations. Although, as Hal Rainey, Robert Backoff, and Charles Levine discuss, there has been a "blurring"¹⁰ between the two and public and private

¹⁰ Hal G. Rainey, Robert Backoff, and Charles Levine, *Comparing Public and Private Organisations*, JSTOR, accessed 10 May 2014, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/975145.pdf?&acceptTC=true&jpdConfirm=true&acceptTC=true>, 234.

organizations share common traits,¹¹ there remain key differences. These differences are crucial to identify as they naturally influence how well a civilian change model for private organizations can be applied to the British Army for the purpose of this thesis. A useful way to distinguish between the two is to look at stakeholders' influence on the Army. Stakeholders are defined as "people or small groups with the power to respond to, negotiate with, and change the strategic future of the organization."¹² The British Army, like other public organizations, has a myriad of stakeholders, operating in a complex environment. Joris van der Voet, Ben Kuipers, and Sandra Groeneveld describe how public organizations operate with a "multitude of stakeholders, ambiguous and often conflicting objectives, a high level of scrutiny and external political influences on decision-making processes."¹³

The stakeholders can be broken into governmental, internal, and external. The key stakeholder is, as it should be, the government. The Army must naturally be firmly under political control, and adhere to political policy. The government also has other offices of state to consider, and these inputs into policymaking as a whole can have a direct influence on the British Army. The parliamentary oversight which Rainey et al. term "legal and formal constraints,"¹⁴ also curtails flexibility and autonomy. The change may

¹¹ Rainey et al., 241. Discussion on Banfield's research: A good example of this are incentives. Both public and private offer incentives but they differ in a key way. Private sector's are "material" in nature whereas public offers "job security" for example.

¹² Colin Eden and Fran Ackermann, *Making Strategy: The Journey of Strategic Management* (London: Sage Publications, 1998).

¹³ van der Voet et al., 11.

¹⁴ Rainey et al., 236.

be imposed upon the British Army, but in turn, the Army does have space in which to design a strategy to meet the political vision, especially internally. Once this strategy is approved by the political masters, it does allow the Army certain freedoms to initiate the programs. Therefore, the government and wider political machinery will direct, but it is left to an extent to the Army to design, implement, and lead change. Political support is a prerequisite and when in place, naturally greatly eases the process.

A further complexity to government control during this period were the ongoing operations in Afghanistan, which made reform under fire a controversial topic. This was also an internal stakeholder consideration for the Army itself; juggling ongoing operational commitments—both standing and contingent—while changing was a distinguishing feature of this period for the British Army.

Another key distinction between private and public organizations, which ties into the government's role, is in budgeting. Financial considerations are acute in the current climate and the Ministry of Defence has to balance its books, which meant cutting its budget and competing for resources with other departments. However, although it can be argued the Army is exposed indirectly to market forces, its budget is ultimately determined by the government, which eliminates freedom to cost-cut and economize in some respects, but in turn, does allow it to not be unduly influenced.¹⁵ Private organizations are far more susceptible to these forces and their shareholders. Competition with the other Services can not be ignored either. Defence's commitment to two aircraft carriers and the F-35 fighter jet means savings have to be made. This will affect the British Army hugely. Indeed, to afford these programs, further cuts may have to be made.

¹⁵ Rainey et al., 235.

Internally, a simple divide between Senior Leadership and what Rainey and Fernandez term “organisational members”¹⁶ can be made. The Senior Leadership must create a vision, devise a strategy, and implement it. They require buy-in from the wider Army but this support is not guaranteed. Indeed, many may be against any change. Much will depend on whether the reasons for change is compelling, well communicated and led¹⁷ which this thesis seeks to investigate. However, there is a compulsion element to any change in the British Army. Orders are orders after all. How much room there is to influence and provide feedback from the organization members’ perspective will also be explored during this research.

A further delineation between public and private organizations is in the importance of public opinion. Both are subject to this pressure to varying degrees, depending on their product, exposure, and persona. For the British Army, public opinion matters to politicians and this is especially true when change occurs. If the public were overwhelmingly against certain steps, then this could slow or eventually stop change. Conversely, with public consent, change will be expected and endorsed. Finally, in the case of apathy or disinterest, the ability to change becomes even easier for Government.

The third group of stakeholders is external, and as van der Voet et al. described above, there are a multitude of external stakeholders that public organizations face. The British Army is subject to great external scrutiny from allies and foes alike from outside

¹⁶ Sergio Fernandez and Hal Rainey, “Managing Successful Organizational Change in the Public Sector,” *Public Administration Review* 66, no. 2 (March/April 2006): 7.

¹⁷ Both Fernandez and Rainey, as well as Dr. Kotter in his 8 Stage model highlight these three characteristics among several as being key to a successful change. Both models will be discussed in more depth later in this chapter.

of the United Kingdom. Allies look at the size of the defense budget and the maintenance of a viable contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in particular the adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization minimum allocation of two percent Gross Domestic Product spent on defense, and for its contribution to operations for instance. A key ally in this, due to the close strategic relationship and alignment of armed forces, is the United States. On the flipside, the British Army's foes, its competitors, look to its capabilities and any possible gaps that could be exploited.

The Fourth Estate also adds to the external scrutiny. Media commentators and retired officers use the United Kingdom's media as its mouthpiece to inform but most critically influence decision makers. A prime example of this is the campaigns launched to save regiments from disbandment, an element of the change program over the last five years.

Finally, there is a key difference in personnel policy. An added complexity to public organizations, and in particular their leadership, is highlighted by Fernandez and Rainey. They state a public organizational challenge is the "frequent and rapid turnover of many executives in government agencies compared to business executives."¹⁸ For the British Army, this turnover is a fact of life and postings are usually for a period of two years. Although Senior Leaders have gone beyond the two-year posting period on occasion, there are also plenty of examples of leaders serving less than two years in post. The impact of this turnover will be addressed during the research.

Therefore, many of the private organizational considerations mesh with public organizations and can be mapped across for the purposes of this research. Nevertheless,

¹⁸ Fernandez and Rainey, 171.

there remain key areas of differences to be cognizant of which means that private sector change models are not an exact fit. In addition, the British Army is also unique, which will be outlined in the next section.

Uniqueness of the British Army

Parallels can be made between the British Army and other public organizations, as well as to private ones as discussed above. This however, comes with a caveat. Although common terms can be used to describe and concepts to define characteristics of the British Army as it can for other large organizations, any military organization is by definition unique. This is primarily because of its *raison d'être*, the use of lethal force, and the *sine qua non* expectation of ultimate sacrifice. Further discussion on the uniqueness of military life has been the subject of considerable literature by notables.¹⁹ For the purposes of this research, one particular area will be highlighted that brings certain unique considerations to the fore concerning any potential changes in the British Army, and that is history.

The British Army is an old organization. Although formally not in existence until the Acts of Union in 1707, many regiments can trace their antecedence to well before this date. This leads immediately to two key deductions. First, in terms of organizational culture, which consists of the “rules, norms, values and basic assumptions,”²⁰ the British Army has a long lineage. Although society and the environment in which the British Army operates has obviously comprehensively changed, the connection to the past in

¹⁹ For example: James Burk and Morris Janowitz among many others.

²⁰ Edgar Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 4th ed. (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley and Sons, 2010), 69, accessed 2 August 2014, <http://www.cgsc.edu/CARL/>.

terms of tradition, *esprit de corps*, and simply put, history is both profound and unique. This creates a bespoke set of conditions, which need to be considered when change is involved.

A prime example of this is the regimental system, which itself has undergone significant change over the years. The amalgamation or disbandment of regiments causes significant emotional controversy and political strife. In terms of the former, regimental associations and former serving members often form groups to stave off change and protect the regiment from disbandment. This in turn, often finds a receptive mouthpiece in the media, an example of which is the campaign to save the Scottish Regiments.²¹ The emotional connection is strong, even in those who are no longer part of the organization, a rare and unique characteristic, and example of external stakeholder influence. This in turn, almost inevitably leads to political involvement.

An example of this is offered by the Royal Regiment of Scotland as well, where even in amalgamation and the forming of a new regiment, the new battalions retained their old names as prefixes; for example The Royal Highland Fusiliers, 2nd Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland. The names, with an associated pledge to reconstitute these battalions back into regiments, became a central pillar of the Scottish Nationalist Party policy prior to the independence vote this year. This illustrates the effect this emotional attachment and connection to history has on external and internal stakeholders, and as a corollary, on the political arena.

²¹ Paula Murray, "Save our Scottish Regiments," *Daily Express*, 13 May 2012, accessed 2 August 2014, <http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/319785/Save-our-Scottish-regiments>.

This history is an important consideration as tradition can hamper transformation and is also evidence that, although much has changed, the British Army retains a significant amount of its past within its culture. Indeed, as Charles Kirke states in his investigation into continuity in change in the British Army from 1700-2000, there is “a remarkable continuity in British Army organizational culture even in the swirl of so much change.”²²

This latter point is the second key deduction concerning the British Army being an old organization. Change has occurred many times and been a constant presence in both war and peace throughout the British Army’s existence. A detailed comparison and description of previous change programs is out of the scope of this thesis. However, it is prescient to note that the Army has downsized before, undergone great cultural change through allowing women to serve for instance, and has on numerous occasions changed its personnel policies. These represent previous transformational changes that have contemporary parallels.

This link to modern day transformation was referenced by Senior Leaders as they set out the changes which are the subject of this thesis. Former Chief of the General Staff General Sir Peter Wall, in his keynote speech on Army 2020 to the Royal United Services Institute outlined how the Senior Leadership “asked some notable academic friends for their analysis of what had worked and what hadn’t, in previous attempts to reform the Army over history.”²³ Some of the findings of this research, such as having an “engine

²² Charles Kirke, *Red Coat, Green Machine: Continuity and Change in the British Army 1700-2000* (London: Continuum Publishing, 2009), 209.

²³ General Sir Peter Wall, “Keynote Speech: General Sir Peter Wall” (Land Warfare Conference, 7-8 June 2012, Church House Conference Center, Royal United

for debate” and “open discussion”²⁴ which General Wall highlighted will be discussed in chapter 4. In summary, the British Army has a unique organizational identity shaped by its long history. Furthermore, change has occurred before in the British Army, it will continue to do so and although history may not necessarily repeat, it “does rhyme.”²⁵

Change Models

The model chosen as the framework for research is by Hal Rainey and Sergio Fernandez, *Determinants of Successful Implementation of Organizational Change in the Public Sector*.²⁶ This model was chosen because it is specifically focused on the public sector, offers flexibility in that it is not a stage-by-stage process like Dr. Kotter’s model discussed below. Rather, each determinant “can influence the outcome of change initiatives at different points of the process.”²⁷ This non-linear nature is vital, as the British Army did not launch all change programs at the same time, which would more readily allow for a staged approach. Rather they were drip fed over a period of time.

In contrast, Kotter’s stages, the other model under consideration, are more prescriptive and the applicability of some of his stages for a public organization, especially the Army, is harder to map. The critical commonality is in their origins as

Services Institute), accessed 2 August 2014, <https://www.rusi.org/events/past/ref:E4F197749D21C6/info:public/infoID:E4FD5C20A0043E>.

²⁴ General Sir Peter Wall, “Keynote Speech: General Sir Peter Wall.”

²⁵ Mark Twain, “Mark Twain Quotes,” Goodreads Inc., accessed 25 May 2014, <http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/5382-history-doesn-t-repeat-itself-but-it-does-rhyme>.

²⁶ Fernandez and Rainey, 7.

²⁷ Ibid. The authors stress its non-linear nature in contrast to Kotter explicitly.

guides to “large-scale, planned, strategic, and administrative changes” or “organizational transformations.”²⁸ In the last five years, the British Army underwent such a transformation.

Dr. Kotter’s model consists of eight stages: establish a sense of urgency; create a guiding coalition; develop a vision and strategy; communicate the change vision; empower broad-based action; generate short-term wins; consolidate gains and produce more change; and anchor new approaches in the culture.²⁹ This is a step-by-step process to achieve successful change. There is significant overlap with Rainey and Fernandez that will be apparent shortly. However, it was worth noting as it demonstrates that aspects of successful change are widely published and accepted, and it is in emphasis and nuance where the majority of differences lie.

Kotter’s overall ideas will be part of this research. In addition and most importantly, his breakdown of managing versus leading is intrinsic to this research. He specifically states that change must be led, and this is the determining factor rather than change management.³⁰ This is not to say management, which he terms staffing and budgeting³¹ for example, is unimportant. Rather that it is through leading that successful change can be accomplished. Although there is some debate over this proposition, which

²⁸ Fernandez and Rainey, 6.

²⁹ John Kotter, *Leading Change* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 21.

³⁰ Ibid., 26. “70 to 90 percent leadership and only 10 to 30 percent management.”

³¹ Ibid.

Rainey and Fernandez discuss,³² the determinants they identify and studies they use to support their work are ones “that emphasize the roles of leaders.”³³

The determinants are also “specific factors conditioning success” and are “considerations” for both “change leaders and participants.”³⁴ This allows for a more flexible interpretation and application during this research. Assessing what should be ideally present, does not mean change was unsuccessful if that factor was omitted. Rather, it provides a framework for analysis and recommended ways of implementing successful change to base research on, exactly as Rainey and Fernandez intended.³⁵

Determinants of Successful Organizational Change

The determinants identified by Rainey and Fernandez will now be looked at with reference to the question set used for the quantitative survey. There are eight determinants, and each of them are summarized and defined below:³⁶

“Ensure the need. Managerial leaders must verify and persuasively communicate the need for change to include crafting a compelling vision of change.”³⁷ As Rainey and Fernandez discuss, this involves five core messages: “we have the capability to change successfully; it is in our best interest to change; those affected support the change; and

³² Kotter, 5.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid., 6.

³⁵ Ibid. “Our main purpose is to identify points of consensus and then to state them as testable propositions for researchers to test and refine further.”

³⁶ Fernandez and Rainey, 8-18. The following page and description of determinants are from Fernandez and Rainey.

³⁷ Ibid., 7.

the change is desirable for the organization.”³⁸ This must be done persuasively and continually. Each of these elements has been interwoven in the survey and interviews that are discussed in the next chapter.

“Provide a plan. Managerial leaders must develop a course of action or strategy for implementing change.”³⁹ This is what Rainey and Fernandez describe as a “roadmap”⁴⁰ for the changes, a strategy with milestones that are clear and specific, avoid ambiguity and inconsistencies.

“Build internal support and overcome resistance. Managerial leaders must build internal support and reduce resistance to change through widespread participation in the change process and other means.”⁴¹ At the core of this factor is that those who are subject to the changes feel involved, and for the “leadership of the change” to develop and nurture this involvement.⁴² This is important as “major change almost always sparks controversy and resistance.”⁴³ A major way to mitigate this is for internal stakeholders to feel involved and part of the change.

“Ensure top management support and commitment. An individual or group within the organization should champion the cause for change.”⁴⁴ This involves having an “idea

³⁸ Fernandez and Rainey, 9.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid., 10.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 12.

champion” or guiding coalition that should be in place throughout, advocate for, and lead the transformation process.⁴⁵ However, a unique consideration for the Army in this regard is the frequent turnover of people and positions, highlighted previously, which makes it very hard for this form of continuity to exist. Furthermore, with promotion considerations, those charged with leading change may not have even been involved at the outset in developing and communicating the plan, but must now deliver it, irrespective perhaps of their own views.

“Build external support. Managerial leaders must develop and ensure support from political overseers and key external stakeholders.”⁴⁶ This is a hard relationship for the sample population, recently promoted majors, to comment on, as it is extremely rare for them to have had exposure to this level of interaction. In this thesis, it will be presented through background research with Senior Leaders, as they understand the interaction with political leaders and wider external stakeholders much more fully.

“Provide resources. Successful change usually requires adequate resources to support the change process.”⁴⁷ The three resources identified for research in this thesis are money, manpower, and time.

“Institutionalize change. Managers and employees must effectively institutionalize changes”⁴⁸ so that the change is enduring. Rainey and Fernandez discuss under this particular factor the pace of change, and how certain models stress the need for

⁴⁵ Fernandez and Rainey, 13.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 14.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 15.

a “gradual or incremental”⁴⁹ process, based on small-scale adoption and then building upon this. The other approach is for a quicker pace of change that can overcome resistance to the proposals.⁵⁰ However, in the public sector, the former method of change may be more challenging than in the private sector as, “frequent shifts in political leadership and short tenures”⁵¹ can undermine the process.

“Pursue comprehensive change. Managerial leaders must develop an integrative, comprehensive approach to change that achieves subsystem congruence.”⁵² The last determinant is concerned with ensuring that the changes are not skin-deep when made, but systemic and in all aspects of the organization. In the Army’s case training, recruitment, command and control, and base locations are “all consistent with the desired end state.”⁵³

These determinants formed the basis for the survey and interviews conducted and will serve as a handrail and reference point in this thesis. In addition, how the changes will be communicated will be a focus of the research. Although Rainey and Fernandez highlight its importance under their factor Provide a Plan, Kotter emphasizes the

⁴⁹ Fernandez and Rainey, 16.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid., 7. Each determinant is taken from the article and the authors words are used directly.

⁵³ Ibid., 16.

requirement more emphatically and persuasively, and has a distinct fourth stage to explain its relevance, “Communicating the Change Vision.”⁵⁴

Kotter describes how it is not easy to cultivate a common understanding and communicate a vision. However, he states, “the real power of a vision is unleashed only when most of those involved in an enterprise or activity have a common understanding of its goals and direction.”⁵⁵ He also highlights key elements to effective communication. Four are worth describing: simplicity; the need for multiple ways of communicating and the different forms of conveying the vision they offer both formally and informally; for example leadership by example and give and take. According to Kotter, two-way communication is always more powerful than one-way communication.⁵⁶

The Context of Change

In this section, the backdrop to all the changes will be discussed. The all important and encompassing context, the operating environment that defined the changes to the British Army will be assessed against four factors: political, economic, technology, and environmental factors.⁵⁷ Political, Economic, Socio-cultural, and Technology is a widely used and accepted tool to define the big picture and an organization’s role within

⁵⁴ Kotter, 85.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 85.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 90. This also includes the key elements of effective communication.

⁵⁷ Mind Tools, “PEST Analysis: Identifying ‘Big Picture’ Opportunities and Threats,” accessed 17 August 2014, http://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/newTMC_09.htm. “Harvard professor Francis Aguilar is thought to be the creator of PEST Analysis. He included a scanning tool called ETPS in his 1967 book *Scanning the Business Environment*. The name was later tweaked to create the current acronym.

it. For the purposes of this thesis, Socio-cultural factors, although relevant, were excluded to ensure a focus on the other factors. Furthermore, the key cultural aspects have already been highlighted in the discussion of the British Army as a unique organization. The environment was added to the redacted format to allow for a discussion of the operational environment. This section will seek to provide a broad overview, rather than in-depth analysis, as the focus remains on the perception of these changes rather than their effectiveness balanced against the planned operational environment, although this was obviously a key consideration of many of the survey respondents.

The Conservative Party, in coalition with the Liberal Party came into power in 2010. They inherited a dire financial situation that will be discussed in the economic situation. In terms of defense policy, the Conservative Party had pledged to hold a Strategic Defence and Security Review every five years and had frequently highlighted the necessity to undergo such reviews during the campaign trail: “the Conservative Party has pledged to hold regular defence reviews every 4-5 years. If necessary we will put this requirement into legislation.”⁵⁸ The last such strategic review had been completed in 1998, after the previous Labour administration had first come into power. The review was certainly long overdue and sought to define how the new political masters would treat the United Kingdom’s defense strategy holistically: “It is the first time that a UK government has taken decisions on its defence, security, intelligence, resilience,

⁵⁸ Dr. Liam Fox MP, “The Strategic Defence and Security Review: A Conservative View of Defence and Future Challenges” (Lecture, Whitehall, 8 February 2010, Royal United Services Institute), accessed 15 May 2014, https://www.rusi.org/events/past/ref:E4F197749D21C6/info:public/infoID:E4FD5C20A0043Ehttps://www.rusi.org/events/ref:E4B62C2FEC5252#.U91Lkk8g_IU.

development and foreign affairs capabilities in the round.”⁵⁹It was within the *Strategic Defence and Security Review* that the Defence Planning Assumptions were made and how this overall “adaptable posture”⁶⁰ would come into fruition. These assumptions and what the government wanted defence to be able to provide are worth quoting at length:

The new Defence Planning Assumptions envisage that the Armed Forces in the future will be sized and shaped to conduct:

an enduring stabilisation operation at around brigade level (up to 6,500 personnel) with maritime and air support as required, while also conducting:

one non-enduring complex intervention (up to 2,000 personnel), and

one non-enduring simple intervention (up to 1,000 personnel); or alternatively:

three non-enduring operations if we were not already engaged in an enduring operation; or:

for a limited time, and with sufficient warning, committing all our effort to a one-off intervention of up to three brigades, with maritime and air support (around 30,000, two-thirds of the force deployed to Iraq in 2003).⁶¹

The focus of this thesis is naturally on the Army, and what it would look like in 2020, the period that was identified by the *Strategic Defence and Security Review*. It broadly stipulated a reduction in size, decrease in armor, and a review of the Reserves.⁶²

The *Strategic Defence and Security Review* essentially defined the parameters for reform. It sought to define and then commit the government to deliver a “sustainable and

⁵⁹ Prime Minister, *The Strategic Defence and Security Review*.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid., 20.

⁶² Ibid., 25. The list comes from 25–26.

balanced Future Force 2020.”⁶³ However, it was not without controversy. A leaked Ministry of Defence document said it had not consulted members of the armed services, internal stakeholders and key external stakeholders such as the United States. Furthermore, the timeframe was very tight, and led to suggestions it was rushed.⁶⁴ The 2010 elections were held in May and the *Strategic Defence and Security Review* was published in October, a short timeframe to adequately define defense strategy for the future. This is tied to the fact that although the operational environment and future character of conflict, both of which will be described shortly and were often cited, the *Strategic Defence and Security Review* was “governed by the overriding strategic objective of reducing the UK’s budget deficit.”⁶⁵

In this regard, it was not strategically directed by defense and security considerations, but by financial ones. This was an extremely valid consideration, which led to the need to deliver the Review promptly. This is not to diminish in any way this imperative, but rather highlight how inextricably linked the need to balance the books was to the strategic vision for defense. Therefore, the strategy was not merely shaped but also fundamentally defined by this consideration. This naturally leads to suggestions that

⁶³ House of Commons Defence Committee, *Towards the Next Defence and Security Review: Part One: Government response to the Committee’s Seventh Report of Session 2013-14, Tenth Special Report of Session 2013-14* (London: The Stationery Office Limited, 18 March 2014), 3, accessed 11 September 2014, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmdfence/1175/1175.pdf>.

⁶⁴ James Kirkup, “New leak exposes MoD fury at defence cutbacks,” *The Daily Telegraph*, 17 November 2010, accessed 17 August 2014, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8141797/New-leak-exposes-MoD-fury-at-defence-cutbacks>. All these factors highlighted in this article.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

the strategy was not a result of an assessment of the defense and security environment, but rather a justification for wholesale cuts and reductions.

Therefore, the link to economics is very clear, a point the Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Peter Wall has made: “Economic austerity is forcing us to redesign our structures to seek to deliver much with less.”⁶⁶ To give a small flavor of the catastrophic effect of 2008, a year that saw banks virtually nationalized in the United Kingdom, on 6 October “£90bn was wiped off the value of Britain’s companies in the City of London’s worst day of trading since Black Monday in 1987.”⁶⁷ Desperate times and the changes that occurred in the British Army in the years following must be viewed in this context. However, there are a couple of further economic issues to note.

First, the British Army had benefitted hugely from the conflict in Afghanistan, which allowed the procurement of advanced systems. Second, the Treasury picked up the tab and in many cases, the Ministry of Defence did not need to pay for the equipment procurement and upgrades. The author has seen firsthand the transformation in personal kit and equipment, ranging from rifle sights to new vehicles. This simply could not continue, and there was a need to balance the books within the Ministry, cognizant that the Treasury would no longer pay. Also the ever-present inter-service rivalry existed which naturally meant that the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force also had to be adequately budgeted. Therefore, there were a myriad of factors that played into the economic situation; not only at a national level, but also inter-service, and within the

⁶⁶ General Sir Peter Wall, “Keynote Speech: General Sir Peter Wall.”

⁶⁷ Nick Mathiason, “Three weeks that changed the world,” *The Guardian*, 27 December 2008, accessed 2 August 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/dec/28/markets-credit-crunch-banking-2008>.

British Army itself. However, the house had to be put in order: “Without strong economies and stable public finances it is impossible to build and sustain, in the long-term, the military capability required to project power and maintain defence.”⁶⁸

Therefore, political and economic pressures were profound. Tied to both of these and briefly described above, are the technological aspects, which for this thesis are focused in particular on equipment. The British Army benefitted from the years in Afghanistan and Iraq, and its equipment overhaul has already been discussed. However, in the grander, whole of Ministry of Defence perspective, there was a 45.6 billion pound black hole⁶⁹ in the budget. The British Army had to take its place with the other services as they assessed which expensive procurement projects would proceed and which would be cancelled. Furthermore, for the Army, its people are the most expensive element of its budget. In addition, there were other wider political factors that needed to be considered and the direct link between jobs and defense contracts. If not assured, specific defense programs certainly had enough political backing to continue. All of this adds to the adverse conditions in which the British Army had to transform technologically in this period. This is not to say that the British Army has suffered greatly. As highlighted above, the operational tempo of the last 14 years led to significant improvement in its equipment. However, room to maneuver in this sphere was curtailed.

⁶⁸ James Kirkup, “Debt crisis is biggest threat to security of West, says Philip Hammond,” *The Daily Telegraph*, 5 January 2012, accessed 2 August 2014, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8993452/Debt-crisis-is-biggest-threat-to-security-of-West-says-Philip-Hammond.html>.

⁶⁹ The Economist, “Missing in action: Britain needs a strategy to make best use of its shrinking capabilities. It isn’t getting one,” *The Economist*, 8 March 2014, accessed 2 August 2014, <http://www.economist.com/news/britain/21598654-britain-needs-strategy-make-best-use-its-shrinking-military-capabilities-it-isnt>.

The largest fallacy in assessing reform of the British Army may be to think that it has the monetary and political freedom to change as it feels is required to meet the environment, specifically the operational environment. Certainly, the operational environment and political conditions can combine to create a conducive environment for military spending. As discussed, in the case of the British Army, this was very apparent in the last 10 years, when campaigns to properly equip troops on the frontline were launched for items such as body armor right through to helicopters. However, this does not happen in peacetime. To design the Army of the future, the contemporary environment must be acknowledged, but also most importantly, the future operational environment must be articulated.

In the *Strategic Defence and Security Review*, the *Future Character of Conflict* was described, based on a paper produced by the Developments, Concepts, Doctrine Centre in February 2010.⁷⁰ Much of this work led to the assumptions made by the review as described in the previous pages. However, it is worth noting several elements and overlap, which describe the environment that the British Army's transformation was designed to meet.

Chief among these was globalization. As it states in the *Strategic Defence and Security Review*: "Globalisation increases the likelihood of conflict involving non-state and failed-state actors."⁷¹ A theme very much nested with the *Future Character of Conflict* paper. The paper highlights the five Cs that will define the environment by 2014, the key timeframe

⁷⁰ Ministry of Defence, *Future Character of Conflict*, accessed 10 September 2014, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/future-character-of-conflict>.

⁷¹ Prime Minister, *The Strategic Defence and Security Review*, 16.

for the paper, although it does map these out as wider trends to 2029 and beyond. Although this time period has been lived already and been marked by continued Afghanistan operations, the Arab Spring and more recently events in Crimea and Syria, it is key to note what change was being planned for, rather than an analysis of what actually transpired and is currently being experienced.

The five Cs are: (1) Congested: for the Army this means that operations in urban and littoral areas will increase among an ever increasing population; (2) Cluttered: that is filled with a myriad of state and non-state actors crowding the battlespace; (3) Contested: across all domains including cyberspace; (4) Connected: that is information technology, information and networks will become ever more important and adversaries will increasingly use these tools; and (5) Constrained: which will be the need to take into consideration legal, moral and ethical factors and the need for greater precision strike to ensure legitimacy of any operation.⁷² These five have certainly been proven true and some of the reforms enacted have certainly been aimed at addressing these considerations, which are to be discussed in the next sub-section.

Change to the British Army

This section will not detail every element of change in the British Army. It will highlight key reference documents and then explore three areas: Army 2020 and the future force structure; personnel reforms, such as redundancies and pensions; and it will examine the New Employment Model. These changes are the focus of this thesis and their impact and the perception thereof formed the basis for the survey and research.

⁷² Ministry of Defence, *Future Character of Conflict*, 22-25. The five Cs have been summarized in this paper.

The *Strategic Defence and Security Review* in October 2010 set the conditions for the British Army in the future. This document's key aspects were outlined in the previous section. To meet these conditions, change was required and this was principally covered by two key documents: *Army 2020*, published in July 2012 and the White Paper that followed in July 2013, *Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued*. The key elements of both these documents will be discussed first.

Army 2020 is the pillar of the British Army's reform. It outlined the three roles for the British Army: "Contingent capability for deterrence and defence; Overseas engagement and capacity building and Civilian engagement and the military contribution to homeland resilience."⁷³ To meet these demands a new force was designed. The key element of this design was what an army with a reduced force of 82,000 (down from 102,000) would look like. *Army 2020* divided the Army into two main elements: a Reactive Force and an Adaptive Force with a third supporting component. The division was into. The Reactive Force was to be at higher readiness and be the Army's "conventional deterrence for Defence," trained to undertake the "full spectrum of intervention tasks."⁷⁴ The Adaptive Force was to be used for a "wide range of tasks" and chiefly, "homeland resilience" and "Defence Engagement."⁷⁵ This force was to have a pool of regulars and Reserves, whereas the Reactive Force, due to its roles would have a far higher preponderance of Regular forces. Supporting both, would be Force Troops, in essence a group of enablers and specialist skillsets. There were obviously some concerns

⁷³ Ministry of Defence, *Army 2020*, 5.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

that this would result in a two-tiered Army, and much work has been done and continues to be done, to codify exactly what the Adaptive Force will be undertaking, in particular in the realms of forward Defence Engagement. A multitude of studies and further reforms have flowed from the *Army 2020* report. Chief among this was the basing of the British Army, and where each formation would be located, especially concerning the permanent move out of Germany. In summary, *Army 2020* is the pillar of the reform of the British Army, and continues to spawn studies and changes to the Army.

Another key area of change was the Future Reserves. In July 2013, a White Paper was produced entitled *Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Varied*.⁷⁶ This was produced after a period of consultation after an initial Green Paper published in November 2012. The White Paper sought to tackle the increased requirement for Reserves as articulated in the *Strategic Defence and Security Review* and subsequently in *Army 2020*. First, there was a rebranding from the Territorial Army to Army Reserve. The plan for the Reserves then sought to address several areas.

The Reserves had been found to be in “decline”⁷⁷ for a number of years and needed to not only be reinvigorated but also redesigned and enlarged, to almost double their size, in order to meet the tasks set. This would see a Reserve Force of 30,000 that would “make best use of the resources available, harness better the talents of the country and provide the Government with the options it needs to address the scale and range of

⁷⁶ Ministry of Defence, *Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued* (London: The Stationery Office Limited, July 2013), accessed 10 September 2014, www.gov.uk/government/consultations/future-reserves-2020-consultation.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 9. Taken from an Independent Study.

future operations.”⁷⁸ There were a range of incentives to join, and increased dialogue with employers initiated to allow Reserves to take a more active role and to tap into the wider workforce’s skillsets. This active role was characterized by greater integration with the Regular Army, and due to the outsourcing of particular skillsets to the Reserves from the Regular Army, increased potential participation in deployments and exercises. However, the increase was not merely done for operational reasons and this transfer of skills to Reserves was done because of cost issues.⁷⁹ Once again, the financial imperative to change was evident.

The plan was controversial from the outset due to a number of factors. Initially, it was the perceived view that a reduction in regulars would be adequately compensated by an increased reserve, which caused a certain degree of consternation. However, the main source of contention, irrespective of whether they could actually fill gaps and bridge the capability divide when fully manned, was the simple fact that the Reserves were no way near the required 30,000 mark and the timeline of 2018 set to achieve this figure was at best profoundly optimistic. This naturally led many to be increasingly skeptical about the overall plan for Army 2020.

To best summarize the plan for Future Reserves and controversial nature of *Army 2020*, a report will be used which was published on 11 June 2014 by The National Audit Office, which scrutinizes public spending for Parliament. This report, on *Army 2020*, stated that the decision to: “reduce the size of the regular Army and increase the number

⁷⁸ Ministry of Defence, *Reserves in the Future Force 2020*, 9.

⁷⁹ Ibid. “In certain specialist areas that it is not practical or cost effective to maintain full time.”

of trained Army reserves was taken without appropriate testing of feasibility or evaluation of risk.”⁸⁰ The report details the risks associated with Army 2020, the financial imperative to achieve savings that determined the implementation of the changes and the recommendation that the Army plan for the eventuality that it does not meet the targets. The critical element, and one highlighted most often by commentators is the manning target.

The report laid bare the problem facing the Army overall in recruiting: only a third of the recruitment target that was required to man the Reserves had been met in 2013-14,⁸¹ illustrating the ambitious nature of the plan. Furthermore, the report also stated that the Regular Army had only filled one-third of its target as well. The pillar of change, Army 2020, and an important component thereof, growing the Reserves, can therefore be seen to be under considerable pressure to meet its targets. Although time remains to achieve the targets, this is important context to the timeframe in which this project was undertaken.

Before discussion of three other key areas of change, these struggles, uncertainties, and harsh realities identified by an independent body, also bring to the fore considerations of morale. As discussed in chapter 1, the Ministry of Defence publishes the *Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey* every year. This year’s report, published in May, once again highlighted that although in some cases figures had stabilized after several years of decline, overall morale was still low.⁸² Since 2010 across all three

⁸⁰ Ministry of Defence, *Army 2020*.

⁸¹ Ibid., 2. Information from Executive Report.

⁸² Ministry of Defence, *Army 2020*, 2. Information from Executive Report.

services, there has been a 12 percent decrease in satisfaction with service life. These figures prompted the Ministry of Defence spokesperson to state: “It is inevitable that any period of change, especially for an organisation of our size and scope, will have an impact on morale.”⁸³ While this is true, it is worth noting that these changes have had a proven negative impact on morale as it adds further context to the change programs and its effect, specifically on how respondents answered the surveys in this project. This period was one of turmoil and uncertainty both professionally, which Army 2020 and the Future Reserve represent, but also personally, with the changes to pensions and the redundancy program, both of which will be discussed next.

On 1 April 2015, a new Armed Forces Pension will be introduced. In essence, there are two key takeaways from this change. First, it is a definite erosion of benefits from the previous scheme, and by definition, it is not as generous as the two other schemes currently in existence. This is the negative side, and one that naturally has caused much dissatisfaction. For example, satisfaction with pension benefits decreased by 24 percent since 2010 across all the services,⁸⁴ a trend just as evident in the Army. However, it is also worth noting that irrespective of the changes, the British Army pension remains one of the most generous available, and is non-contributory. An aspect that is often overlooked. Below are highlighted some of the key aspects of the new pension scheme. The list is not exhaustive, but these tenets have been selected due to their impact and because they were cited during the research for this project.

⁸³ The Guardian, “British armed forces suffer collapse in ‘morale’ as coalition cuts take hold,” *The Guardian*, 21 May 2014, accessed 25 September 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/may/21/british-armed-forces-morale-mod-tory-cuts>.

⁸⁴ Defence Statistics (WDS), *Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey*.

First, all benefits accrued under previous schemes will be protected. However, those age 45 and over in the Army will not transition to the new scheme. This latter aspect will be discussed in chapter 4, but was raised by many who highlighted the absence of moral courage in this decision, as all those of younger, very operationally active generations would be subject to change while those more senior would not.

The pension will also now be based on a Career Average Revalued Earnings design⁸⁵ and no longer on a service person's final salary. There will no longer be an immediate pension point, but rather an Early Departure Payment that will be moved to 20 years of service (this was previously 16 years for officers) or 40 years of age, and full benefits will not be paid until the formal state pension age is reached, unless you serve until 60 years of age.⁸⁶ This is a significant change and one that many people still do not appreciate, along with the ensuing effects upon terms and services. For example, an Intermediate Regular Commission for an officer in the British Army was for 16 years of service, which tied in with the immediate pension point. Now, as the new Early Departure Point is not until 20 years of service, then the lengths of commissions must also change and match the new pension.

Those who continue to serve will undoubtedly feel the effects of the new pension changes. However, another aspect of the change in the last five years has been the forced requirement to lower numbers in the Army through redundancies. From 2011 to 2014,

⁸⁵ Ministry of Defence, "Defence Internal Brief," ArmyNet, 16 January 2014, accessed 25 April 2014, www.armynet.mod.uk.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

around 8,000 from the Army were made redundant,⁸⁷ in four tranches, and totaling around eight percent of the Army strength. As ever, those affected by redundancy fell broadly into two camps: those who volunteered and were willing to leave and those who did not. As articulated in *Army 2020*, the British Army had to reduce by 20,000 and although natural attrition could address a percentage of this total, redundancies were required. How the redundancy program was led is an area researched by this thesis and will be discussed in chapter 4. Any redundancy program will be controversial. However, there are two key conclusions from the redundancy issue.

The redundancy program marked a shift in mindset in the Army, which had previously been so focused on retention, to a situation where people were being told to leave. This cultural shift is not unusual and in times of high recruitment for example, the Army can afford to be more selective. When recruiting is poor, the inverse is true. However, for the cohort selected in this research, all enlisted and served in an army that was very retention-focused, and this change in outlook was a definite source of some discussions during interviews. Second, this is not the first time redundancies have been carried out. In the early 1990s for example, there was a large redundancy program; echoing that many of the characteristics of the changes are unique to the time but, in general terms, due to the age of the British Army, are absolutely nothing new.

Potentially the most drastic change in the Army and one that has yet to be fully articulated and enacted is the New Employment Model. The New Employment Model is “a wide ranging programme looking at many aspects of Terms and Conditions of Service for the Armed Forces. This includes accommodation; pay and allowances; training and

⁸⁷ Ministry of Defence, *Army 2020*.

education; and the structures and processes used to manage Armed Forces' careers.”⁸⁸ As this description articulates, the parameters for the study are vast and suggest fundamental change across the entire spectrum of personnel policy as well as professional training and education. The consultation period ended in July, which coincided with the publication of the internal brief quoted above.

Some of the areas the study is researching include home ownership in the services and means to incentivize⁸⁹ this, simplification of pay and allowances, increasing the attractiveness of overseas postings, and career streaming. There is some detail coming out of the research and pilot schemes have been launched, such as the Home Purchase Incentive, which provides an interest free loan for first-time homebuyers. However, although the changes are far-reaching, not enough has been enacted to fully appreciate the potential breadth of the New Employment Model. Nevertheless, this change program had to be part of the research of this thesis because it will affect every serving member of the British Army, his or her families and significantly alter the way of service life. It is also well known in the Army that this change program is in the midst of being scoped and eventually significant measures will be enacted. Therefore, it is an important part of the transformation, and illustrates the ongoing and incremental progress of the change and how interdependent many of these programs are.

Many of the changes outlined in these documents have not been fully enacted yet. There remains much to resolve, principally in the New Employment Model, but most

⁸⁸ Ministry of Defence, “Defence Internal Brief, New Employment Model, SERIAL: 2014DIB/46,” ArmyNet, 21 July 2014, accessed 10 September 2014, www.armynet.mod.uk.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

importantly, what the real impact of Army 2020 will be in terms of having a Reactive and Adaptive Force, how the Reserves will fit in, and if it will even be manned adequately to fulfill its proposed roles. However, this section sought to detail what was planned, as well as the current state of some of the programs in order to frame the responses to both the qualitative and quantitative surveys. The section has not gone into exhaustive detail about each change program, but has highlighted key aspects to illustrate the effect, both the positive and in some cases controversial nature of the measures.

Summary

The British Army is not just another public organization, it is a unique organization with several distinct characteristics. The majority of change literature is based on private organizations; a key model in this field is Dr. Kotter's eight-stage model. Nevertheless, public organizations are subject to similar pressures as private organizations and although influences and considerations differ in their scope and relevance, many of them remain fundamentally the same. The model selected, one by Rainey and Fernandez, is focused on public organizations and was chosen due to its non-linear nature, and because it has a set of eight determinants that assist change that are described in this chapter. They do not all need to be present, but rather research has shown that they can greatly assist change programs when present.

The changes undergone by the British Army, and the ones selected for respondents to be questioned about during this project have been summarized in this chapter, for example Army 2020. These changes have been profound and continue apace. This transformation was set against a backdrop of political change post-general election, ongoing operations in Afghanistan, severe financial constraints and the transformation

planned for a future operating environment as defined in the *Future Character of Conflict* paper and articulated in the *Strategic Defence and Security Review*. It is important to note that this change was in many ways imposed upon the British Army rather than purely by choice. In addition, the impact of inter-service rivalries for funding and the Government commitment to large-scale procurement projects such as aircraft carriers and the F-35 also severely impact upon the British Army. There may have been a need to change and adapt to the new environment, but it was certainly conducted within a restrictive environment.

There remains much to be done and many issues are still to be resolved in each of these key areas of change as discussed in this chapter. Chapter 3 will outline how the research was conducted, and the Rainey and Fernandez model used to frame both the quantitative and qualitative surveys.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

The British Army underwent a great number of changes in the last five years. The changes were significant, and no member of the Army was left unaffected. How these changes were implemented by Senior British Army Leadership will be the focus for the research and in particular how these changes were perceived by a select cohort of majors. The previous chapter reviewed background to the research and key areas that must be considered in any discussion of the organizational transformation the British Army underwent. It outlined how public and private organizations differ, and how the British Army is a unique organization. Rainey's and Fernandez's eight determinants that condition successful change were then discussed, which highlighted overlap with a pre-eminent change model. The key changes to the British Army were extrapolated, and most importantly, the chapter identified the political, economic, and other environmental considerations that both determined the overall context of these changes and their imperative.

In chapter 3, the methodology for this research will be discussed. The structure of this chapter follows the steps outlined by Mark Rossman in his 1995 book, *Negotiating Graduate School*.⁹⁰ The primary question this research seeks to address is: What is the perception of majors promoted in 2012 regarding the implementation of the British Army's transformation by Senior British Army Officers? The Rainey and Fernandez model will be used as the frame throughout.

⁹⁰ Mark H. Rossman, *Negotiating Graduate School* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995), 95-99.

Description of the Methodology

The research involved a purposive sample of British majors, which will be described under sample and population shortly. The sample was purposive as it targeted a very specific sample, with distinct criteria and a defined set of questions to meet the research objectives. This project consists of a mix of quantitative and qualitative research. The list of questions for the survey is at appendix A. The study is also descriptive in nature and approached the topic in a three-stage process.

First, was analysis of the quantitative results to broadly discern views on the six key change programs, identify demographic differences among the cohort and apply the quantitative findings to the eight determinants. Second, qualitative analysis added detail to the quantitative results and identify linkages between them and any lessons or additional themes raised by the interviewees. Finally, these two components were merged and compared to synthesize the results, and identify areas of good and bad practice, as well as lessons learned.

The quantitative research utilized a questionnaire with 13 questions. At the outset, key demographic data were sought to identify participants: branch, broken down into combat, combat support or combat service support; regiment; commissioning method, whether they joined as officers or were from the ranks; operational tours; and the level of interaction they had with Senior Leadership through experience at brigade, division or at Army headquarters. For analysis purposes, three of these demographics were used: branch, interaction with Senior Leadership and commissioning method. In addition, these demographics and the responses to the survey were analyzed against each other to test the hypotheses that an individual's branch, interaction with Senior Leadership, and

experience produce different opinions from the rest of the cohort. This will be discussed later in the chapter during data analysis.

The questionnaire contained a set of value-based questions. A Likert scale with five points of reference was used⁹¹ in some cases, in order to obtain data on how each of the major change programs was perceived. The questions were structured to the eight determinants that Rainey and Fernandez identified. Some of the questions, such as question two, are not included in the table. This is because they were posed to obtain an overall picture of change. In addition, some questions, for example number eight, are asked with reference to each program identified in the research. The table below shows the alignment of the questions to each determinant:

⁹¹ Howard Schuman, *Method and Meaning in Polls and Surveys* (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2008), 30.

Table 1. Question Mapping to Each Determinant

Determinant	Question
Ensure the Need	3. There was a need to change the British Army: Strongly Disagree – Disagree – Neither Disagree or Agree – Agree – Strongly Agree
Provide a Plan	8. The Senior Army Leadership developed a sound course of action to implement these changes: Strongly Disagree – Disagree – Neither Disagree or Agree – Agree – Strongly Agree 9. The Senior Army Leadership persuasively communicated the changes: Strongly Disagree – Disagree – Neither Disagree or Agree – Agree – Strongly Agree
Build Internal Support and Overcome Resistance	10. Did you have any involvement in the change process/help shape the changes taking place: Yes – No
Ensure Top Management Support and Commitment	7. How much power did Senior Army Leaders have in influencing the changes? No Power – Very Little Power – Some Power – Moderate Power - Great Deal of Power. 12. Was Senior Army Leadership support for change evident throughout? Yes - No
Build External Support	This will be garnered from secondary source material and background research with Senior British Leaders.
Provide Resources	11. How adequate were these resources to support change? Very Inadequate – Inadequate – Adequate – Very Adequate
Institutionalize Change	13. How well have the changes been incorporated in the British Army? Not Very Well – Fairly Well – Moderately Well – Very Well
Pursue Comprehensive Change	4. Overall, what has been the impact of the changes in the British Army in the last five years? Very Negative – Negative – No Impact – Positive – Very Positive 6. How optimistic are you of the British Army's future? Not Optimistic at All – Somewhat Optimistic – Very Optimistic

Source: Created by author using information from Sergio Fernandez and Hal Rainey, “Managing Successful Organization Change in the Public Sector,” *Public Administration Review* 66, no. 2 (March/April 2006): 1-15.

In addition, views were sought on how these changes were communicated. Although not a stated determinant, this is intrinsic to providing a plan and ensuring its implementation. In addition, Dr. Kotter also highlights it in his Fourth Stage on communicating the changes. The importance of communication to successful change was described in the previous chapter. Finally, an open-ended question asking for any further comments was posed to capture any additional information.

To obtain greater fidelity and detail on the changes undergone by the British Army, a set of broader follow-up questions were set to obtain qualitative data. Under each of these questions, further probing questions were set to obtain additional information.

To achieve balance, the views of British Army's Senior Leadership were also sought and this was conducted electronically. This was done mainly for two reasons. First, this thesis is concerned with the majors' views and perceptions of the change, not the views of Senior Officers per se. Therefore, there is no requirement to obtain qualitative or quantitative data of their views as it is used for background and framing, not analysis. Second, their views are required from a professional standpoint to ensure that a thorough appreciation of the environment is gained from a senior perspective and therefore, to place British majors' opinions in context.

Design of the Study

The questionnaire was distributed to a select cohort of majors, the sample description is below. The selection was convenient as it took advantage of Exercise Eagle Owl, a biannual joint training event between the United Kingdom and United States at the Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This phase of the

research was completed between the 15 and 27 June 2014. Two other factors added to its convenience. First, the overall population was narrowed automatically due to the period in which the research was conducted to those who had been selected to attend the British Staff College in January, eliminating those who were in the September course. The selection process to attend which British Staff College course is not due to performance but timing and is also based on what job the major had before Staff College and the job he was selected for after Staff College. Therefore, the cohort's make-up is broadly similar to that of the September intake. The one caveat is that there are a larger proportion of technically trained officers in the January course due to the Battlespace Technology Course that runs prior to the January commencement. Second, although the manner in which the survey was conducted was by confidential hard copy, the surveys were handed out by group leaders and people known to the author.

Every effort was made to avoid unintended bias, and a reasonable attempt was made to take a stratified sample across all three branches: combat, combat support and combat service support. In total, 41 participants responded: 15 were combat officers, and 11 each from combat support and combat service support, and four declined to provide branch information. The quantitative research was not random and this will be reflected in the decision rule to ensure a higher level of statistical confidence, which will be discussed in data analysis. On completion of the surveys, they were electronically loaded into the Inquisit system, which then produced all the relevant statistics and allowed for analysis.

The qualitative research was conducted with volunteers garnered from across the course. There were three groups of individuals interviewed for a total of 10 interviews.

The first group was those who approached the author directly offering to be interviewed, and were keen to be interviewed after completing the survey. The second group was those who were part of the author's training syndicate during the exercise and were asked to participate. Finally, the third group was those sought by the author in order to achieve a balance between branches and make sure the qualitative research was demographically representative, as above with roughly one-third from each branch. It should also be noted at this time that since the author is part of the cohort being interviewed, many of those interviewed were known to him.

The Senior Officers who were approached for their views on the changes and to provide context were all known to the author, another example of convenience research. However, this convenience is also a benefit. Because of an already existing relationship, the Senior Leadership would be more open and candid, which will provide vital insights into the process of change. This data collection was conducted solely by email during September and October.

Sample and Population

The population used was officers selected for promotion to major in 2012. A total of 470 were selected in 2012.⁹² This includes those who commissioned directly from the Royal Military Academy (314) and those who commissioned later, directly from the ranks initially to the rank of Captain (156). The sample size gained during research was 41, just under nine percent. All majors must attend the British Intermediate Command

⁹² Ministry of Defence, "Military Secretariat Board Proceedings," ArmyNet, 2012, accessed 10 June 2014, www.armynet.mod.uk. All the figures are taken from these proceedings.

and Staff College (Land) in order to promote and continue their career. As part of this residential course, they attend an exercise at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas where the research was conducted.

Interviews were done in order to gather qualitative data on their experiences. This is the focus of the research. A total of 10 British Army majors were interviewed to obtain greater information on the changes in the last five years and their overall perception. Officers from different branches of the Army, and therefore experiences, were interviewed to ensure as wide a reach as possible. The breakdown was roughly one-third of each of combat, combat support and combat service support officers for both the qualitative and quantitative areas. This ensures a broad spread of experience and eliminated undue regimental and branch bias for the purposes of analysis.

The demographics sought at the beginning of the questionnaire were used to assess differences and whether there was a significant relationship between branch, experience, and commissioning method and how the participants responded to the survey. These hypotheses were tested using the means described in data analysis below.

The study did not seek the views of younger (captains and below), or older (more senior majors) generations of serving officers. In addition, the opinions of non-commissioned officers and soldiers, while tremendously valid, are out of scope for this thesis. However, questions were asked of the officers interviewed about how the changes were perceived by those under their command, directly or indirectly.

Instrumentation

For convenience, electronic collection of verbal information⁹³ was used throughout. Questionnaires were completed in hard copy and then entered into the Inquisit system. In two cases, participants completed the survey electronically. A tape recorder was used during the interviews.

Data Analysis

The data collection was focused, as shown by the questionnaires, on how the changes were first perceived, then communicated and enacted. In particular, it is how the Senior British Leadership was viewed which is critical. Each question is designed to feed into the Rainey and Fernandez model, as shown above. The model provides the framework and handrail to allow for comparison between previously identified best practices and how the British Army carried out its transformation. A particular emphasis was on the perceived involvement in the process, and how changes were communicated.

The questionnaire's data were analyzed using the Inquisit system. The aim of this analysis was to garner a generic overview of the cohort's views, and identify possible trends and areas to investigate. To establish confidence in the results, a benchmark of 70 percent was used for favorable (Agree or Strongly Agree) or unfavorable (Disagree or Strongly Disagree) responses as the case may be. This figure was chosen to account for the relatively small size of the sample, and to ensure that any response would have to be strongly weighted either favorably or unfavorably before any conclusion could be drawn. To further establish confidence in the statistical data, a confidence level of 13 percent

⁹³ Rossman, 97.

was calculated based on the available population and the sample size. This means that for any response, a figure of 83 percent must be reached before a reasonable conclusion (95 percent chance or better of being correct, taking into account population and sample size), could be drawn that this opinion was widely held across the entire population of majors who promoted in 2012.

To analyze the demographic data, the Kruskal-Wallis Test was used. This test is a “non-parametric statistical test”⁹⁴ which seeks to “compare mean rank differences among two or more groups.”⁹⁵ It is a way to analyze two or more groups’ answers to specific questions and to see if there was any statistically significant difference in the distribution of their answers. In this survey, the groups were the demographics sought at the beginning of the survey: direct or late entry officers; employment at brigade, division, or headquarters, and to which branch the major belonged. This information was then used to determine if there were any trends among demographics and their answers to certain questions. To avoid any “Type I”⁹⁶ errors, a Bonferroni adjustment was used to determine “if a pair of mean ranks is significantly different.”⁹⁷ This was set at 0.05,⁹⁸ so a one in 20 chance that the results were random and ensure that they are statistically sound.

⁹⁴ William Eugene Martin and Krista D. Bridgmon, *Quantitative and Statistical Research Methods: from Hypothesis to Results* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2012), 71.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 70.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 371.

⁹⁷ Martin and Bridgmon, 371.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 33. This figure was suggested by Sir Ronald A. Fisher “one of the founders of statistics,” and will be used for the purpose of this research.

The qualitative data were analyzed against the quantitative data findings as well as the Rainey and Fernandez model. These were used to gather detail and fidelity to ensure there was depth to the research findings. In addition, the qualitative research was crucial to assessing where any good practice exists and if anything could be done better.

Summary

This chapter described the methodology of the research. How the research was conducted, and the means, and instrumentation used was also discussed. The chapter also outlined the demographics and sample that was taken both qualitatively and quantitatively of the cohort of majors who promoted in 2012, and how this group was further delineated to refine the research. The chapter then described how the data collected would be analyzed against the factors highlighted by Rainey and Fernandez. The limitations to the research and areas that were not investigated were also highlighted. In addition, a clear confidence level was set to assess the research and ensure that it would be representative and as accurate as possible. The next chapter will discuss the results of the research.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

In the previous chapters, the background to and context of the research was outlined. The profound change initiated, exemplified by the reduction to 82,000, was described and why the research is important; this cohort of majors who promoted in 2012 lived through the changes and must now lead the Army into the future. In chapter 2, the nature of change was discussed and a model identified which will be used as a handrail for the thesis throughout. Furthermore, the British Army's uniqueness was extrapolated and the environment and context of change was described. In the previous chapter, the method of research was outlined and in this chapter, the data collected will be presented and analyzed.

Chapter 4 will open with an overall picture of the quantitative survey's results. This will paint a picture of how each change was perceived. Once this is complete, the survey's results and answers to follow-up questions will be transposed onto the Rainey and Fernandez model to highlight good and bad practice. The results will then be dissected by demographics that were collected to identify any differences. The qualitative data will then be used to set the survey's findings into context and to identify linkages with the quantitative section. The final section will see both these components merged to highlight good and bad practice and any lessons from the research.

Quantitative Results

Overall Findings

The changes in the last five years were perceived negatively by those who were interviewed by survey. When asked in question 4 what impact various changes had on the British Army, the response was for the most part either very negative or negative, as shown in Figure 1. The impact of each program was asked in question 2. In terms of redundancies, 88 percent viewed the change as having either a negative or a very negative impact. This was also the case for the Future Reserves program (83 percent), the Move to 82,000 (87 percent), and 87 percent felt overall that the changes introduced had a negative impact on the British Army. For all these areas of change, the percentage exceeds the confidence interval required (83 percent) in order to state with 95 percent certainty that the rest of the cohort of majors would respond in a similar way.

Three other answers to questions in the survey met the 95 percent statistical significance threshold. In response to question 3, 93 percent of those surveyed agreed or strongly agreed that there was a need to change the British Army. In addition, the response to question 8b, concerning whether Senior Army Leadership had developed a sound course of action to implement the Future Reserves program, found that 85 percent strongly disagreed or disagreed that they had. Finally, question 10 asked whether the respondents had any involvement in the change process/ help shape the changes taking place. 93 percent said No.




Figure 1. The Impact of the Changes in the British Army (Question 4)

Source: Survey #14-06-073, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, August 2014.

Perceptions of the impact were also sought for the Army 2020 program and the New Employment Model. In the case of Army 2020, only 56 percent saw it as negative, and no one saw it as being very negative. Furthermore, 29 percent stated it had been positive, with the rest saying that no impact had been felt. While none of these results met the defined statistical significance threshold required, they may illustrate three things. First, that to an extent, people can see some benefits to the pillar of the British Army's reform, even though the percentage is low. Second, that not all change was felt to be overwhelmingly negative. Third, that due consideration was given by each respondent to each program in turn rather than a blanket or default setting that it was all negative.

When asked an open-ended question as to what change they perceived to have had the greatest impact and why, several felt it had been a combination of the programs

that had the largest impact. The most outspoken comment was that a “combination of all the change programmes has resulted in confusion, low morale, insipid cynicism and a real term lowering of the offer.” Most were more measured, but 10 of the 40, so 25 percent, stated pensions, which will be discussed shortly, had the greatest impact. The pillar of the Army’s reform, Army 2020, was also cited. The consensus was that it was needed but many disagreed with a couple of its key concepts, specifically that the Reserve targets were “unachievable” and that a two-tiered Army could be created due to the Adaptive-Reactive Force construct.⁹⁹

The Reserve target is worth isolating as a key source of “consternation” as one respondent phrased his response in the quantitative survey. The reasons provided for this viewpoint were that the Future Reserves program had been poorly explained and articulated, that it would have the greatest impact as the plan would ultimately place more “pressure” on the Regular Army to train the Reserves, and that it was fundamentally unachievable. One described it as a “ridiculous” plan and three cited it as a source of lack of credibility for Senior Leaders. There were no positive comments on the plan for the Reserves in the survey. This must be caveated through several interviewees stating that the manner in which the Reserves was briefed at staff college had been very “bullish”¹⁰⁰ and had not helped in the perception of the program.

In the case of the New Employment Model, 56 percent felt it was either very negative or negative. However, 37 percent stated that it had no impact whatsoever.

⁹⁹ Quotes are from British Army Leadership Survey, conducted 16–27 June 2014, Reviewed and approved by the CGSC Human Protections Administrator and Quality Assurance Office. The survey control number is 14-06-073.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

Provided the opportunity to expand upon their answers to this on the questionnaire, some of those who answered “No Impact” caveated it by stating: “not yet understood” or “TBC” and that it would have the “greatest impact” in the long term, but has to run its course.¹⁰¹ This was a limitation of the survey, as it did not provide the opportunity for a Don’t Know response, which would have been of benefit in the case of the New Employment Model. These results did not meet the statistical threshold required, however, many felt that it had been poorly communicated and that key aspects had not been explained down the chain of command as much as the magnitude of the proposed changes should demand. This will be discussed later in this chapter.

There were also generic questions asked concerning the changes over the last five years. When asked if there was a need to change the Army, 93 percent either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement. No one disagreed that there was a need to change. Once again, as it comfortably exceeds the confidence level of 83 percent, it can be stated with confidence that if this survey were repeated, it would produce the same results among majors who promoted in 2012. Answers to this question will be examined more closely in the next section.

¹⁰¹ Quotes are from British Army Leadership Survey, conducted 16–27 June 2014, Reviewed and approved by the CGSC Human Protections Administrator and Quality Assurance Office. The survey control number is 14-06-073.




Figure 2. The Need to Change the British Army (Question 3)

Source: Survey #14-06-073, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, August 2014.

However, as stated above, 87 percent felt the impact of change had been negative overall. Furthermore, when asked to comment if the changes have been beneficial, 49 percent felt that they had not been, 37 percent were undecided and only 15 percent agreed that they had been beneficial.




Figure 3. Have the Changes been Beneficial? (Question 5)

Source: Survey #14-06-073, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, August 2014.

These results can be viewed as contradictory. A convincing majority of respondents felt a need for change, but equally the changes that occurred were viewed as having an overwhelmingly negative impact with minimal benefit. It was out of the scope of the research to ask what program or change respondents would have been preferred or felt was required, the focus is on how the changes were enacted and led. However, these results show a clear dichotomy. The fact that change was required was accepted. When it came, it was perceived overall very negatively with little benefit or at best with a wait out and see mentality. Why this might be the case will be examined next with the findings

from the quantitative survey transposed onto Rainey's and Fernandez's eight determinants and dealt with in turn.

The Eight Determinants

Ensure the Need

The first determinant was Ensure the Need. The question asked for views on the following statement: There was a need to change the British Army. In this case, as discussed above, the responses were very clear. A total of 83 percent agreed, and 10 percent strongly agreed to this question. The remaining seven percent were undecided. As Rainey and Fernandez state, ensuring the need must be done persuasively and continually. It must be communicated effectively.

This high percentage was explained in the open-ended question that asked them to explain their response. Some highlighted the post-Iraq and Afghanistan period as a time for re-calibration and "efficiency" to make the Army more cost-effective and in order for the Army to appropriately meet the future challenges.¹⁰² Indeed, some cited that in their opinion, the lack of a holistic, truly transformational program and strategy as the most disappointing aspect of change; it did not go far enough. Essentially, the argument that the Review in 2010 was not a genuine review of aims versus capability, but financially driven. This is accompanied by concern over what next year's Review will contain.

However, the golden thread in all the survey responses was that all acknowledged and appreciated the financial situation. This naturally meant the Army needed to change.

¹⁰² Quotes are from British Army Leadership Survey, conducted 16–27 June 2014, Reviewed and approved by the CGSC Human Protections Administrator and Quality Assurance Office. The survey control number is 14-06-073.

In fact, many also wrote that defence had not been hit as hard as many other departments of state. This illustrates that this generation was more than aware of the pressures and realities faced during this period, but the need was poorly communicated.

Communication

In his eight stages, Dr. Kotter stressed the need for communication throughout change, as highlighted in chapter 2. It is an area that Rainey and Fernandez stress in both their Ensure the Need and Provide a Plan determinants. Due to its criticality and the frequency with which it was highlighted in the research, it will be dealt with separately.

Those surveyed were asked if the Senior Army Leadership persuasively communicated the changes. Of the sample, a total of 17 percent strongly disagreed, 51 percent disagreed, 15 percent were undecided, and only 17 percent agreed that the changes had been persuasively communicated, with no one strongly agreeing with that statement. Kotter's key elements for good communication identified in a previous chapter were: simplicity; using a multitude of forums, in different forms; setting a leadership example; and making it a two-way process. When offered the opportunity to expand upon this, several discussed that the outcome, Army 2020, was well known, but that there was no "strategy for implementation" and therefore Senior Leadership were struggling to explain the "how" of how it was going to be achieved.¹⁰³ This in many ways eroded internal support, home-team support, by adding significant uncertainty.

¹⁰³ Quotes are from British Army Leadership Survey, conducted 16–27 June 2014, Reviewed and approved by the CGSC Human Protections Administrator and Quality Assurance Office. The survey control number is 14-06-073.

This was born out by the positive comments concerning communication. A few stated that they appreciated when Senior Officers were “honest and open about this (changes) being about cost saving.” They also communicated it well even if “they did not agree with the changes themselves.” Honesty as a theme shone out in all the surveys and one stated that there was a “coherent, strong message from Army HQ.” Unfortunately, he continued, it was “not entirely convincing.”¹⁰⁴ The means of distribution was also mentioned in a positive light by one respondent who pointed to the positive use of Defence Information Notices and roadshows in communicating change.

Unfortunately, honesty seemed to be a double-edged sword on occasion with many stating the occasional bluntness of the message delivered as ineffective and annoying: “Make it work is not a change programme management tool” as one put it. Coherence and understandability is also key in the Army due to the spread of ranks, experiences, and educational levels. One late entry officer recalled his time as a section commander and the need to explain at the simplest level what things meant for his soldiers. Describing the information provided on the changes, he felt it was too “conflicting or difficult to understand” and that searching for information on the Defence Intranet was difficult.¹⁰⁵

The New Employment Model receives considerable attention, as many do not fully appreciate what is going to happen; or having been briefed, have many unanswered questions. This can be attributed, to an extent, to the fact that the model’s consultation

¹⁰⁴ Quotes are from British Army Leadership Survey, conducted 16–27 June 2014, Reviewed and approved by the CGSC Human Protections Administrator and Quality Assurance Office. The survey control number is 14-06-073.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

period was only recently completed and much work is still to be done. Communication will continue to be discussed throughout the findings.

Provide a Plan

The second determinant was Provide a Plan. This plan had to be a strategy that was clear, specific, and avoided ambiguity and inconsistencies. It is providing the how to change inclusively, so as to help the British Army navigate the turbulence This was dealt with by question eight of the survey, and whether the respondents felt the Senior Leadership developed a sound course of action to implement the changes in the six programs already discussed. The answers to each change program varied significantly.

First, only the course of action or plan developed for Future Reserves was conclusive enough (85 percent strongly disagreed or disagreed that the Senior Leadership had developed a sound course of action) to say with confidence that if this survey was completed again with different members of the cohort, the results would be the same. For the other programs, views were more balanced. The plan for the Reserves, outlined in chapter 2, is controversial. However, many of the other change programs are controversial as well. It is perhaps not just because the plan is controversial, but also because the overwhelming consensus was that it simply will not work. The numbers and timetable required to meet the Reserves plan might indicate the plan is subject to tremendous skepticism.

In terms of programs for which respondents felt Senior Leadership had adopted a sound course of action, the plan for redundancies was either agreed or strongly agreed to be sound by a total of 53 percent (48 percent and five percent respectively), and 36 percent either strongly disagreed or disagreed. This points to some success for how the

redundancy plan was developed and subsequently implemented. Although, the unpredictable nature of the program and its effects cannot be ignored.




Figure 4. The Development of the Plan for Redundancies (Question 8b)

Source: Survey #14-06-073, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, August 2014.

Although not statistically significant, the second change program that was marginally considered sound, and with a caveat, was Army 2020 itself (38 percent agreed). As discussed in chapter 2, this may be because there is still a lot of work to be done, and the true nature of Army 2020 reform is yet to be realized. This is shown by the same percentage of respondents (38 percent) who were undecided (did not agree or disagree), that a sound plan had been developed. Finally, 20 percent disagreed with five percent

strongly disagreeing that the course of action was sound. Again, as with redundancies, this is a relatively positive indication that Senior Leadership developed a sound course of action. While the data did not meet the statistical significance threshold, it is safe to say that this sample agreed that change was required, and the pillar to the transformation, Army 2020, was viewed better than others, or at least with a let's see mentality.

The three remaining change programs that were part of this research had similar responses and the largest percentage either disagreed or strongly disagreed, but not conclusively. For pensions, 48 percent either disagreed or strongly disagreed with 24 percent undecided and only 28 percent agreeing that the plan had been sound. Considering the impact that pension reform will have, this perhaps points to a realistic appreciation by many that change was always going to come and that the Army offer was still generous. It is also interesting considering the negative impact pensions were perceived to have, yet still not a convincing enough majority felt that the plan had been poorly implemented. However, for pensions, it was in the qualitative research that an interesting dimension to the change occurred. This will be discussed in the next section.

The responses to the Move to 82,000 followed a similar breakdown to the responses for pensions. A total of 50 percent either strongly disagreed or disagreed, 30 percent were undecided, and only 20 percent felt that the development of the plan had been sound. This was not statistically conclusive. However, a sizeable proportion of this sample perceived the plan as unsound and were undecided as to its impact.

Last, for the second determinant, the responses to the New Employment Model once again stood out. This is because of the relatively large size of the sample that was still undecided, as was the case when questioned about what the impact of the New

Employment Model would be. Although many of its tenets are yet to be enacted and work is still ongoing, the responses indicate a general lack of awareness and knowledge about such a fundamental program.

Overall, in terms of Providing a Plan the pattern of the responses in this sample disagreed that Senior Leadership had developed a sound course of action. This is in contrast to both the overall perception of the changes, which as shown in the previous section, was negative to change but very cognizant that change was necessary. This is positive in the sense it suggests that those surveyed felt that Senior Leaders did the best they could, and irrespective of the negative effect, the plans were sound. However, perhaps more telling is that, excepting pensions, where a small majority (53 percent) agreed a sound plan had been developed, for every other change program, people were either in disagreement or still undecided whether the plan was sound. Senior Leadership had an obligation to provide a plan and to include the wider army.

Build Internal Support and Overcome Resistance

The essence of this determinant is for those subject to the changes to feel involved in the process and for leadership to “develop and nurture this involvement.”¹⁰⁶ This is seen as a key way to overcome the controversy and resistance to change that may exist, and was certainly the case for several of the programs the Army undertook. However, before addressing this factor in change, recall that the British Army differs, as explained in chapter 2, in that orders from above are exactly that. For those serving there are few recourses if they do not like proposed changes, as compared to a civilian company.

¹⁰⁶ Fernandez and Rainey, 4.

The question in the survey asked: Did you have any involvement in the change process/help shape the changes taking place? The answers available were a simple Yes or No. A total of 93 percent of those surveyed said no. It can once again be reasonably deduced, due to the overwhelmingly negative response to this question that this view was held across the population of majors who promoted in 2012. Involvement in the change means that internally, people will understand the why and how of change. To do this communication and top-level support must be evident. Plus for change to be institutionalized, it in turn requires internal support which stems from this involvement.




Figure 5. Involvement in the Change Process (Question 10)

Source: Survey #14-06-073, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, August 2014.

Ensure Top Management Support and Commitment

Rainey and Fernandez describe this as having an “idea champion”¹⁰⁷ or guiding coalition in place for the duration of the change to lead the transformation. The Army may not always be able to have this due to promotion and postings, as outlined in chapter 2. Nevertheless, the importance of having committed, visible leadership with continuity is highlighted as an important factor in successful change. Two questions were asked in the survey to ascertain if this was the case during the British Army’s transformation: How much power did Senior Army Leaders have in influencing the changes; and Was Senior Army Leadership support for change evident throughout?

Whether Senior Leaders had any power to influence change is important due to the compulsion aspect of the transformation. Was the perception of majors who promoted in 2012 that the changes were purely imposed, or did the Senior Leadership have the operational space to design, plan and execute? The responses were on a Likert scale with the following responses: No Power, Very Little Power, Some Power, Moderate Power, and Great Deal of Power. For both extremes, in which either the leadership had no power to influence, or they had a great deal of power, there was little support; two percent and 10 percent respectively. The majority of the sample (69 percent) felt that they had either some (37 percent) or moderate power (32 percent). The remaining 19 percent stated that the Senior Leadership had very little power.

This was a mixed response and seems to endorse that the political and economic factors were well recognized and accepted as the driving factors for change. They were also significant constraints in terms of time and resource. However, the results also

¹⁰⁷ Fernandez and Rainey, 13.

indicate that Senior Leadership did have, to a degree, the power to shape how things were to proceed.

Once again, an open-ended question was asked in the survey, and again the first and foremost theme was that there was a broad recognition that change had to happen regardless. One respondent described his perception that Senior Leaders had been “effectively handed an ultimatum.” Others stated that it was more a “damage limitation” exercise rather than a question of Senior Leadership having the ability to influence or shape changes. In addition, “political primacy” was cited as a driver for change. Nevertheless, in line with the survey’s findings, most expressed the view that Senior Leadership cannot influence “whether we change but they can influence how we change,” as one officer phrased it.¹⁰⁸

The second question was a Yes/No response to: Was Senior Army Leadership support for change evident throughout? The responses to this question were split right down the middle. This suggests that although there was doubt, equally, Senior Leadership were in the eyes of just as many effectively endorsing and championing change. This is a key aspect of successful change. Although a further demographic breakdown will be conducted in the next section, it is worth noting at this stage the most interesting demographic difference that was found during the research.

Using the Kruskal-Wallis comparison with Bonferroni adjustment, as described in chapter 3, it was found that when responses to this answer were compared to the results of whether or not the respondent had experience at brigade, division, Headquarters Army

¹⁰⁸ Quotes are from British Army Leadership Survey, conducted 16–27 June 2014, Reviewed and approved by the CGSC Human Protections Administrator and Quality Assurance Office. The survey control number is 14-06-073.

level, that is direct contact with Senior Leadership (one–star command and above), an extremely interesting result ensued. Most respondents to this question, 36 out of 40, provided this demographic information.

For those who had no experience working at this higher level, 79 percent answered yes, thereby stating that they felt Senior Leadership support for change was evident throughout. For those who had experience at this level, the result was almost inverted, with 60 percent saying no, it had not been evident. These results are not convincing enough to draw conclusions across the cohort. However, they suggest that those who worked directly with Senior Leadership either felt that they did not lead change and support it effectively, or perhaps the exposure led to being privy to a far more candid, closer relationship in which views were expressed by Senior Leadership that perhaps were not wholly supportive of the change. Therefore, those who worked at this level ascertained that Senior Leadership support was not evident throughout. Those who had not worked at this level, perceived Senior Leadership support to be sound throughout. This may point to a gulf between the public and private opinions of Senior Leadership. Publicly, leadership was positive and showed support. Privately and among trusted staff a potentially more open, personal opinion not conforming to the party line was espoused.

Provide Resources

The next determinant examined by the survey was whether the resources provided were adequate to support the changes being undertaken. Three key resources for change were identified and used for this survey: finance, time, and manpower. These specifically addressed the constrained financial situation, the expeditious nature of expected change

with associated tight timeframes, and with redundancies and overall downsizing, whether there was enough manpower. There were four options: Very Inadequate, Inadequate, Adequate, and Very Adequate. The overall results were that resources were generally perceived to be inadequate in all three spheres, although this was not overwhelmingly so.

Not surprisingly, the results were the clearest concerning finance resourcing, with 66 percent of the sample feeling that finance to support change was either very inadequate or inadequate. However, concerning time, only 54 percent surveyed perceived that it was either inadequate or very inadequate. This indicates that, even though there was undoubtedly a multitude of programs and over a relatively short period, and with perhaps some hindsight, merely a small majority felt that there was not enough time. Considering that an often heard complaint was the pace of change, this research suggests that at best it was seen to be a bit rushed, but not overwhelmingly so.

The third resource was manpower. This resource was identified due to the huge numbers of gapped posts in the Army, which are jobs that are unfilled at the present even though there is a stated requirement. In total, 61 percent of the sample thought that the manpower to support change was very inadequate or inadequate.

Although not as categorical as other aspects of this research, having resources in place to support change has been shown to be a key element of implementing successful change. However, the Army was conducting change in a very resource constrained environment, and an acknowledgement of this was shown in the responses. There was no mention in the survey or in interviews that a lack of resource had been decisive in either the negative impact, or perception of change.

Institutionalize Change

Rainey and Fernandez highlighted this determinant as it ensures that change is enduring as it is firmly institutionalized. The survey asked: How well have the changes been incorporated in the British Army? The answers possible ranged from: Not Very Well, Fairly Well, Moderately Well, and Very Well. In this instance, 21 percent felt that the changes had not been very well incorporated, 41 percent felt they had been fairly well incorporated, 33 percent moderately well, and five percent very well. Again, it is important to note that the plan for Army 2020 will not, as the name suggests, come into effect until 2020, even taking into consideration the large changes already occurring and engrained. The answers to this question may reflect the ongoing, transient nature of the change, although there will also be an element who feel that, irrespective of the timeframe, the changes have not been very well incorporated. Furthermore, the changes are happening; however, the key consideration is whether or not the changes would be adjusted if found to be inappropriate or unachievable.

In the open-ended portion of this question, people did not just discuss whether the changes had been institutionalized, but the actual effects the changes had on the British Army. First, it was the notion, expressed by Senior Leaders whom many had heard, that there was only one plan, and no alternative. This lack of a “Plan B” one respondent labelled as “unacceptable and disingenuous” and highlighted Reserves as the case in point. What happens if or when it fails? One institutional change that was cited by several, but particularly so by a combat support officer was how redundancies had a “terrible impact on morale” and that the program made the Army cease to look like an organization that looked after its people. In his opinion, few now believe “CDS (Chief of

the Defence Staff) or CGS (Chief of the General Staff) when they say people are the Army's greatest resource."¹⁰⁹

Pursue Comprehensive Change

Two questions were asked to see if the changes were not just skin-deep but holistic and achieved "system congruence."¹¹⁰ First as already highlighted above, 87 percent felt that the changes had been either very negative or negative. The second question was about how optimistic they were of the British Army's future. A total of 22 percent were not optimistic at all, 66 percent were somewhat optimistic, and 12 percent were very optimistic. Evidence of a can-do approach in the midst of great change and uncertainty. The changes were certainly perceived to be comprehensive by the sample participants, although lack of statistical significance prevents generalization to the population of the cohort. In almost every opportunity afforded to respondents to expand upon their answers, most used words such as "great," "major," and "re-structure," to describe the change programs and developments over the last five years.¹¹¹ A casual glance at the magnitude of programs and its effects would lead the vast majority to acknowledge that it had been comprehensive.

¹⁰⁹ Quotes are from British Army Leadership Survey, conducted 16–27 June 2014, Reviewed and approved by the CGSC Human Protections Administrator and Quality Assurance Office. The survey control number is 14-06-073.

¹¹⁰ Fernandez and Rainey, 15.

¹¹¹ Quotes are from British Army Leadership Survey, conducted 16–27 June 2014, Reviewed and approved by the CGSC Human Protections Administrator and Quality Assurance Office. The survey control number is 14-06-073.




Figure 6. Optimism Moving Forward (Question 6)

Source: Survey #14-06-073, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, August 2014.

The effects of this comprehensive change are well known, at least superficially. However, several discussed a further impact of the transformation and how it had changed the deal for those serving and for those who were looking at enlisting. In particular, this was expressed in terms of personnel policies and the often-cited package of benefits, a theme touched on in the previous determinant. One stated that the changes had “negatively changed the package that is being offered,” a key retention tool, and how the Army would not be perceived in the future as a “safe” employer, and one which not

only provided income and benefits, but a lifestyle and role which had attracted many previously.¹¹²

However, the most interesting comment concerning the British Army's future and the way ahead was delivered in one of the interviews, and when relayed to other interviewees, was broadly agreed upon. This officer's view was that his generation was "tired of its own schimpfing"¹¹³ and felt that you either leave or just get on with it.

Rainey's and Fernandez's eight determinants were in part selected because of their non-linear nature. However, more critically, it was also because they are non-prescriptive. This means that although these determinants should be present, and ideally convincingly so, their absence is not so detrimental as to cause a failure in the change program.

Because of its uniqueness and culture, the British Army was always going to implement the change. The compulsion from external stakeholders, politicians and the overall environment meant that it had to happen. Internally, this was also the case as once ordered, the plan was going to happen. It is in the enactment and effects of these compulsions where crucial lessons can be learned. When transposed onto the eight determinants, the results of the survey show that there was evidence of good practice, and enough nuance to prove that elements of successful change were a part of the British Army's transformation. For example, most recognized the need for change, it was

¹¹² Quotes are from British Army Leadership Survey, conducted 16–27 June 2014, Reviewed and approved by the CGSC Human Protections Administrator and Quality Assurance Office. The survey control number is 14-06-073.

¹¹³ Common slang in the British Army, originates from the German "schimpfen" to complain. In the British Army, it is usually associated with gripes and/or complaints about how things are done.

certainly comprehensive, and, in many ways, what resource was available was used. In terms of institutionalization, this is still unknown for many. However, certain areas were significantly lacking in terms of how successful change should be enacted based on the determinants listed. These will be discussed further later on in this chapter and in chapter five, and are: involvement in the change process; persuasive communication; the provision of the plan and to an extent top level support. Demographic differences will now be examined prior to discussion of the qualitative part of the research.

Demographic Differences

Responses to the survey questions were compared using the combat arm of the officer (Combat, Combat Support, Combat Service Support), whether they were a direct or late entry officer, and what experience they had with Senior Leadership. This was done using the Kruskal-Wallis test. The responses, which had statistically significant differences that cannot be explained by chance alone, are discussed below. The key difference, the link between experience with working for Senior Leadership and the perception of their support has already been discussed.

Firstly, in terms of combat arm differences, in three of the questions (on the New Employment Model twice and on redundancies) Combat officers were the least favorable. However, this was not a common enough occurrence throughout the survey to suggest that Combat officers were statistically significantly more negative than others were.

The second difference isolated by the test was in commissioning method, either direct or late entry, and how they answered the question: Did Senior Army Leadership persuasively communicate the changes? Late entry officers were far more in agreement with this statement: 50 percent versus 15 percent of direct entry officers. Although this

may suggest that the greater experience of late entry officers has meant that they perceive changes to actually have been well communicated, the size of the sample is too small to draw any meaningful conclusion. Notwithstanding the difference between exposure to Senior Leadership and the perception of their support for change, no further key demographic differences were found during this research using the three variables selected.

Qualitative Research

In total, 10 officers were interviewed for this research. Three were late entry officers, and the breakdown by combat arm was: four from Combat, and three each from Combat Support and Combat Service Support. This was done to ensure a breadth of experience and views. The interviews were conducted to add further detail and perspective not only on the changes themselves, but most importantly, how they were implemented. The themes largely remain the same as those on the surveys, and views expressed mirror some of the responses to the open-ended questions of the survey. However, what is apparent overall, was the greater appreciation and nuance expressed during the interviews rather than during a black and white survey.

To add context and validity to the interviewees' comments, as five of them highlighted, they had all been briefed by subject matter experts at British Staff College on numerous occasions on several change programs. Therefore, in many ways, this should place them in a more knowledgeable position than others in the Army. However, the effects of this could be negative. As one interviewee stated: "There was a general apathy

from the leaders of change combined with inadequate policy explanations which meant that a group of implementers (majors) of change were left disenfranchised.”¹¹⁴

Harsh Realities

Whereas in the surveys, the perception of Senior Leadership and the decisions, actions and programs themselves, are viewed negatively overall, the interviews identified four key areas of balance and reality that must be considered. To an extent, these have already been articulated and are: change was politically imposed and inevitable because of the financial situation; there was not much else that could have been done; many in the research cited examples of good practice; and direct leadership may not have supported the change process as fully as they should have. This latter point is, however, a direct consequence of not building internal support and of poor communication. Senior Leadership have an obligation to communicate change, which the research suggests that they did not.

Inevitability of Change

Once again as in the surveys, acknowledgement of the unavoidable nature of change was constant throughout. Everyone stated that change had to happen. It was unavoidable and this fully endorses the results of the survey. As before, the reason cited was the driving force of the financial situation. In no interview was the need to restructure and change for the future operating environment mentioned. This is a crucial point; this major cohort saw changes being driven solely by the current financial

¹¹⁴ Quotes are from Qualitative Research on British Army Leadership, conducted 16–27 June 2014, Reviewed and approved by the CGSC Human Protections Administrator and Quality Assurance Office. The survey control number is 14-06-073.

environment not the long-term operational requirements of the Army. Naturally, as discussed previously, an army must be designed to meet future threats. However, simply no one believed that this was the case. The operating environment was financial.

This constrained environment naturally meant that Senior Leadership was limited in what they could achieve. As one interviewee stated: “Not sure what else they (Senior Leadership) could have done” and that he “genuinely believed the decisions they make and how they come to those are with a straight bat.” Added to this element of compulsion of change was time considerations, and as another interviewee stated, it “had to happen quickly which instantly means people think it wasn’t done well, which was not always the case.”¹¹⁵

This perception of a lack of time, although not conclusive in the survey, is often raised as a justification by those against many of the changes. However, as this interviewee explained, “how long do you need to make hard decisions set against a background of financial imperatives which meant action was required expeditiously?” Another interviewee agreed with this and stated: “I don’t think anything could have been done better. Anything done would have been unpopular, consequences would have been extreme, and it had to be autocratic in many ways. Senior Leadership to an extent put their chin out.” There are undoubtedly areas that caused a certain degree of upset and interviewees highlighted areas where improvement could be made, which will be

¹¹⁵ Quotes are from Qualitative Research on British Army Leadership, conducted 16–27 June 2014, Reviewed and approved by the CGSC Human Protections Administrator and Quality Assurance Office. The survey control number is 14-06-073.

discussed shortly. However, there was a degree of acceptance that, no matter what, members of the Army would have found some of the programs negative.¹¹⁶

Role of Direct Leadership

In addition, there was discussion anecdotally of how direct leadership, those that are one rank above or have daily interaction with their subordinates, was not as good as it should have been. As one interviewee explained: “Each stage of the chain of command was given lines to take, but right down to lowest level they were expected to take on chin and justify some of the actions. Some were better than others.” Transformational reform requires buy-in at all levels, and especially within an army construct, all must play a role in disseminating and accomplishing the mission. A couple of the interviewees suggest that some did not lead as well as they could have, because of the impact of change on themselves career wise for example, or even because they fundamentally disagreed with the change.¹¹⁷

It is not just Senior Leadership’s responsibility to lead change. One interviewee talked of how at “sub unit command level perhaps, they did not show more moral courage and were not diligent enough in implementing the lines to take.” Asked to provide an example, he used retention: “Junior NCOs coming up and saying they were thinking about signing off, previously company commanders would have fought to save them, but now a bit more; yes so am I to be honest, and perhaps it would be best to

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Quotes are from Qualitative Research on British Army Leadership, conducted 16–27 June 2014, Reviewed and approved by the CGSC Human Protections Administrator and Quality Assurance Office. The survey control number is 14-06-073.

leave.” Which to use his phrase, suggested “disenfranchisement.” This raises an interesting; so what? Why did direct leadership have this response and why did the JNCO feel this way? Could it solely be down to a lack of internal support for change or is it potential evidence that there was a lack of trust in change and how it was being led, permeated from the top down, and what impact it would have. There was significant resistance to change which manifested itself in disenfranchisement and also possibly a culture change in the Army, which will be discussed in the next section.¹¹⁸

Good Practice

The interviewees also highlighted areas of good practice. One anecdote recited was about a former Chief of the General Staff, General Wall, visiting an infantry regiment (Second Battalion, The Royal Fusiliers) to inform them they were to be disbanded. That a Senior Leader would take the time to engage with all ranks, break the bad news personally and in a direct fashion, according to the interviewee, went down extremely well. General Wall, as Chief of the General Staff, occupied the strategic level of the Army at the time. Therefore, his focus is more up than down. However, this interaction highlights a theme raised in a couple of interviews which was the lack of senior level interaction down to the lower levels of the Army, at unit level rather than at a headquarter or brigade level.

Senior Leadership engagement at a lower level than would normally be expected, justified potentially due to the profound nature of change, might have resulted in better communication of the transformation and in far more members of the Army feeling

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

involved in the process and would have built internal support. Interviewees did not suggest visiting every unit, but certainly enough so that they were visibly leading, endorsing, and explaining what was happening. It should not simply have been cascaded down to direct-level leadership to carry out, although this direct level should rightly be expected and trusted by Senior Leadership to fulfill their part in the plan.

Another example of good practice was the redundancy program, which was to an extent endorsed by both quantitative and qualitative research. It was undoubtedly controversial, received considerable media exposure; and by its very nature, would be unpopular. However, in the quantitative findings, a small majority (53 percent either agreed or strongly agreed) that a sound course of action had been developed and this was to an extent endorsed by the qualitative interviews. One interviewee said: “Redundancies, (the) way it was published was very good. No better way of doing it: negative for some, positive for others.” This last point refers to the opportunity it offered many to leave and start a new career, versus those who were forced to leave. Another commented that: “Redundancy tranches were pretty well planned” which considering the impact they had, suggests that it was a good example of a well-led program, notwithstanding certain complaints and the huge affect this had on people’s lives.¹¹⁹ Redundancies, like pensions and the disenfranchisement aspect mentioned, had an impact on the wider Army culture. This will be discussed next, along with other themes that emerged from the qualitative research.

¹¹⁹ Quotes are from Qualitative Research on British Army Leadership, conducted 16–27 June 2014, Reviewed and approved by the CGSC Human Protections Administrator and Quality Assurance Office. The survey control number is 14-06-073.

Themes from Qualitative Research

Interviewees discussed several areas of reform at length. There was overlap with and direct linkage to the quantitative findings. These linkages and the themes emerging from the interviews will be highlighted in this section. Pensions will be discussed first, an oft-cited element of discontent, and an area that was raised in the interviews and in the open-ended section of quantitative research.

While acknowledging the impact on terms and conditions and the decrease in the offer, the most interesting element of pension reform that was highlighted during the research was the moral aspect. Leaders have to set the example, *Serve to Lead*, especially in the British Army, as defined by the Sandhurst booklet in chapter 1. This is especially the case during change. There were several outspoken views on this subject in the open-ended opportunity at the end of the survey to provide any experiences with change as well as in the interviews themselves.

This perceived lack of moral leadership by Senior Leadership was most evident regarding pensions. Among those that stated pensions had the greatest impact wrote comments such as a “blatant failure in leadership by Senior Leaders” and that the Senior Leadership had given themselves a “free pass” by excluding themselves from pension reforms.¹²⁰ Although this respondent recognized the need for change in pensions, the manner in which this was conducted annoyed him the most. Although these views were not held by all who expressed that pensions had the greatest impact of all change

¹²⁰ Quotes are from Qualitative Research on British Army Leadership, conducted 16–27 June 2014, Reviewed and approved by the CGSC Human Protections Administrator and Quality Assurance Office. The survey control number is 14-06-073.

programs, it does point to the need for an organization such as the British Army, which espouses the moral component of fighting power, for it to be evident in all that we do.

The pension reform and how it eliminated the decision-makers from any adverse effects, was perceived by many to be an obvious break from this moral leadership: “Bit of an issue with moral leadership piece that one-star and above kept pension rights and those below didn’t. This led to a trust issue in my opinion between them and others. Difficult game to be fair, but certain elements of senior leadership aren’t going to rock the boat and don’t exhibit the moral courage when required.”¹²¹

To counterbalance the views of these two interviewees, one major stated that: “Morally I think, as a whole, the Army does things very well. What we have done badly in terms of change programmes, is in the requirement to brief it to the guys so they understand it.”¹²² This leads to the communication of change, another theme throughout the project.

Communication

The need for good communication has already been discussed, and is another strong linkage between the quantitative and qualitative parts of the research. The majority of the issues have been highlighted already, but a few more pieces were raised during the interviews. The best summation of the overall perception of the communication of change was: “All comes back to the briefing and how it was introduced. We all get part

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Quotes are from Qualitative Research on British Army Leadership, conducted 16–27 June 2014, Reviewed and approved by the CGSC Human Protections Administrator and Quality Assurance Office. The survey control number is 14-06-073.

of job (Senior Leadership's) is making difficult decisions, but it is then your role to brief the decision they have had to make, but for them to make it and for us to hear about it on a DIN (Defence Information Notice) is wrong.”¹²³ Once again, this advocates a more inclusive, personal and proactive approach, rather than merely sending out messages and information.

As one interviewee said: “Too many emails, too many approaches: D-Day was release of message one, H-Day was message two. If you do that, malicious rumour takes hold.”¹²⁴ He and two other interviewees expressed the feeling that they were being messaged rather than led during the change process. Although Kotter advocates a multitude of approaches and forms of communication, this interviewee suggests as others did, a more simple, direct and personal approach to communicating the change. This may be due to the very nature and culture of the British Army, and the value attached to personal leadership and interaction. Nevertheless, communication was a constant theme.

However, it should not be overlooked, that due to the worldwide dispersed, and at that time, heavily deployed nature of the British Army, detailed electronic communication was necessary and certainly had to be part of the communication plan. This was especially pertinent in the case of redundancies, a heavily politicized issue that had to be phased and managed according to a very strict schedule. Senior Leadership could not be everywhere at once, and electronic communication and reliance on direct level leadership was to be expected. However, as General Wall showed, there is a

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Quotes are from Qualitative Research on British Army Leadership, conducted 16–27 June 2014, Reviewed and approved by the CGSC Human Protections Administrator and Quality Assurance Office. The survey control number is 14-06-073.

requirement to be there at the point of need and leverage fully the British Army's structure and systems to implement their vision. That was the Senior Leadership's responsibility.

There was also a realistic angle to all aspects of change, which one interviewee embodied in his response to questions on communication: "In terms of change management, it is great news for Senior Leadership as you have a programme such as pensions which fundamentally alters terms of service, but (they) are delivering to an audience which fundamentally ain't going anywhere if you deliver it badly. People will grumble about it but aren't voting with their feet."¹²⁵

Another area of personnel policy which was constantly raised, was the New Employment Model. Simply, as borne out by the survey, few understand and appreciate what it is. The majority of the reasons for this have already been covered, but one area brought out in interviews was the impact of the proposed changes, as far as they were known, on the culture of the Army and its appeal going forward. This can be tied into the previous discussion on pensions and disenfranchisement.

Cultural Impact of Change

The disenfranchisement aspect is the perception that people are no longer viewed as the greatest resource. The loss of good people was mentioned in several cases, which has continually been the case throughout history in the British Army. Although, it may feel more acute at this time and this perception was empathized with by many. However, as always, it was bracketed with the acknowledgement that there was a need to downsize

¹²⁵ Ibid.

and to meet the plan (82,000) in the timeframe, which meant people leaving was unavoidable.

However, there is a perception that damage has been done internally regarding how the organization is perceived, especially in how it looks after its people. In addition, there is also a perception that the view of the army has been damaged externally in the eyes of the public. To be a reference army, and one which is able to recruit and retain the right people, is vital for the future; not just for the Army, but for the wider society that any army must represent. One interviewee described how the “saddest” thing about change had been the timing; a heavily deployed army, a feeling that a good job had been done and a “closer relationship (built) between public and the Army”. Then transformation occurred.¹²⁶

The changes to the British Army will also affect how it is perceived and how well it will be able to recruit in the future. Interviewees expressed concern about what the British Army would be able to do to attract the right people. Coupled with this, there were concerns about retention, and how the British Army is changing from an “expeditionary to stay at home” army, and that in the future deployment will be seen as excitement and adventure, rather than what it truly is: “your job”. This is “fundamentally changing mindsets,” and not in a good way in this interviewee’s opinion.¹²⁷ These fears are largely a result of basing, downsizing, and Army policies, which, for example, encourage home ownership and staying in one location for your career.

¹²⁶ Quotes are from Qualitative Research on British Army Leadership, conducted 16–27 June 2014, Reviewed and approved by the CGSC Human Protections Administrator and Quality Assurance Office. The survey control number is 14-06-073.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

The perception of a lack of involvement in change and subsequently the failure to build internal support was a key finding from the quantitative research. This was endorsed in the qualitative research: “The plan for the future has been articulated well, but analysis and how they came to those conclusions could have been better. (We are) less certain how that was made – was it a *fait accompli*?” Not many felt involved in the “how” as one interviewee put it, endorsed by another major who stated: “(Senior Leadership) misconstrued questions about how it was being implemented with people contesting the policy.” There may be a link between perception of involvement in the change process and the viability of the actual program. However, this was not asked during the research. It was also expressed that there had been: “No strategic thought; two year cycle in jobs” ¹²⁸ which prevented this from happening. This job turnover and two-year cycles leads to another theme from the qualitative research.

Accountability

Ownership and accountability concerns were raised by two of the interviewees. One stated that the “transient nature of moving positions (in the Army) and ownership of program meant that those initiating won’t own the problem in years to come.” This officer, from a combat arm, then discussed how there is considerable emphasis on being held to account at Staff College and what this means, “but that each Senior Leader (who has visited) has basically said this won’t happen.” He rhetorically asked what would happen if Army 2020 failed, the Reserves, or the New Employment Model, who will be

¹²⁸ Quotes are from Qualitative Research on British Army Leadership, conducted 16–27 June 2014, Reviewed and approved by the CGSC Human Protections Administrator and Quality Assurance Office. The survey control number is 14-06-073.

held accountable for this? His view was that: “No one will get fired.”¹²⁹ The lack of a single person, a “change champion”¹³⁰ or group (guiding coalition) as Rainey and Fernandez would phrase it, was evident during the research.

The current Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Nick Carter designed Army 2020. However, due to normal career progression, he did not remain in charge of the communication and implementation, as he moved on to different posts as he promoted. He is now in charge for the next period as Army 2020 continues to come into being. The perception was that there was never a single, visible person or group which led each change program. This is contrary to best practice identified within the civilian sector, and according to two interviewees contradicts the notion of being held accountable.

Two other topics worth noting are gapping and redundancies. Gapping, unfilled posts, especially at captain and major level, is a currently a concern across the British Army.¹³¹ Two interviewees discussed it from very different perspectives. The first put it as: “From my peer group/cohort there is some concern about gapping. We have been working hard for quite a long time, and with redundancy what does this mean in the future for all the gapping, who is picking up the slack?” Whereas the other interviewee to mention it stated: “I am not very tolerant of people who complain about gapping, you

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Fernandez and Rainey, 16.

¹³¹ Deputy Military Secretary, briefing (British Embassy, Washington, DC, 17 October 2014).

take casualties on the battlefield and get on with it.”¹³² There was nothing conclusive to be drawn from the research about gapping, and it was not asked directly to the interviewees or on the survey.

As the quantitative research suggested, Reserves was an area which elicited strong, and statistically significant, responses. The trend was undoubtedly negative during discussions on the Reserves. However, the key argument or concern about the Future Reserves plan was first that it is not viable, summed up perhaps best by the quote: “Everyone below a certain rank knows that reserves is not going to work but all above it are saying it is going to and say: don’t stand in its way. Which comes back to the moral courage piece.” The second is the effect integrating Reserves will have on the Army itself and the creation of a two-tier Army because the majority of the Reserves will be in the Adaptive and not Reactive Force. One interviewee said: “Reserves are part of a one concept army and should be (incorporated) across the entire army, reactive and adaptive. But there is now a noticeable divide, (and) a two-tier army will be created.”¹³³ The viability and real effect the Reserves plan will have on the Army was a concern in most of the interviews.

A couple of interviewees were slightly more non-committal. However, only one interviewee perceived the plan for Reserves positively and felt that it would work: “Reserves is a reality and (I) do think it will work, and I absolutely get it. People (will)

¹³² Quotes are from Qualitative Research on British Army Leadership, conducted 16–27 June 2014, Reviewed and approved by the CGSC Human Protections Administrator and Quality Assurance Office. The survey control number is 14-06-073.

¹³³ Ibid.

realize in time that this is the future and that's it.”¹³⁴ More detail on the Reserves and why it was mentioned consistently will be discussed in the next section.

Quantitative and Qualitative Synthesis

This section will focus on three thematic linkages between the qualitative and quantitative research, as well as discussing Future Reserves and the New Employment Model programs. The three linkages are: the perception that the cohort had minimal to no involvement in the change process (survey question 10, with statistically significant results); that persuasive, consistent communication was perceived to be lacking (survey question 9, with statistically insignificant results); and the impact that a perceived lack of how, the provision of the plan by Senior Leadership (survey questions 8a through 8f, with mixed results), had on responses to the survey and in the interviews.

Correspondingly, although this section will focus predominantly on negative aspects of change, it must be noted once again that the fact that changes were perceived to be negative by this sample is no surprise. Pensions and redundancies affected livelihoods, the decrease to 82,000 was perceived by many as reducing the operational capability of the British Army to such an extent that it would no longer be able to contribute in a meaningful way. This was an anathema to a generation which had been significantly operationally deployed. A further caveat, is that there were also contrasting views on each change program; for example the difference between the negative responses to the plan for the New Employment Model and Reserves and the more positive feedback with reference to redundancies. Good practice was recognized

¹³⁴ Ibid.

throughout the surveys and interviews. Furthermore, most if not all, acknowledged the pressures and reality of the situation.

Communication and Building Support

However, the discrepancy between the overwhelming conviction that change had to happen and the more muted response to how this was conducted, points to certain areas where improvement could be made. As discussed previously, persuasive communication is one of those. Although there was not enough statistical proof to state that poor communication was a defining feature throughout the changes during this period, the responses to the survey coupled with the interviews, do indicate that there was certainly significant room for improvement in how the changes were communicated. The need was recognized, but was not communicated consistently and to the right standard. Spin was mentioned in that Army 2020 was spun as the best way to meet future threats rather than what it truly was; a cost saving measure. This points to a perceived lack of transparency and, potentially, honesty in some of the communication. Senior Leadership did not explain to the wider army what was or was not realistically feasible once change was imposed. Anecdotally, personal and direct interaction by Senior Leadership was always perceived far more positively than the messaging through information notices and emails.

Another example of this is the New Employment Model. As raised by several majors interviewed, and mentioned initially at the start of the qualitative section, the majors at Staff College should be in a privileged position of being briefed and made aware of all the changes at regular intervals due to the large number of guest speakers. These are, more often than not, senior representation often charged with leading the program. Whenever the New Employment Model was mentioned, it elicited a shrug and

people were very non-committal as to what it would mean. This must be tempered by the reality that not much has yet been enacted. Nevertheless, as virtually all will move to company command within three years and be responsible for the welfare of soldiers, that overall, this group of majors still seem to be unaware of what the New Employment Model will entail and are unaware of the plan to execute is a worrying conclusion. This can be attributed in part to communication, and the response is naturally that Senior Leadership cannot brief what has not been decided or is still in the planning phase. However above all, it is the perception that the cohort was not involved in the change process or has no input, which has harmed the perception of this key change program and others over the last five years. This, as discussed, negatively impacted on building internal support and therefore, the impetus behind the changes. Both the quantitative and qualitative parts of the research agreed on this topic.

The Reserves have elements of all three thematic linkages identified at the beginning of this section. First, the communication of the Reserves plan may have been flawed. In discussion with a senior general involved in the plan for Future Reserves, he stated that there had to be a construct, a framework on which to grow the Army quickly if required. The Reserves would be this framework and allow defence to respond to emerging threats and augment the smaller size of the Regular Army. This rational, sensible narrative and explanation was perceived by many of those subsequently asked in interviews as having never been properly articulated by the chain of command, specifically Senior Leadership. Instead, the plan was undermined from the outset by its planning figures, lack of detail, and essentially the how. This is why it was mentioned consistently in interviews. In addition, it is also the only program that produced

conclusive results in the survey to state with confidence that if the survey were completed again, it would return the same results; namely, that the plan developed for Reserves was perceived to be unsound.

Involvement in the Process

The final area of synthesis to be discussed is involvement in the process. The perception of a lack of involvement is a rather damning finding from this research. Certainly, there are caveats; the Army's culture precludes mass participation and the rank structure can inhibit junior members of the organization opportunities to participate to the same degree as in a civilian organization. In addition, time was tight to deliver a plan to meet the *Strategic Defence and Security Review* and the political leadership's wishes.

However, it also suggests that this is one area where significant improvement can be made. The views of junior members of the organization may prove not to be valid or assist materially in change. The involvement in the process, or feeling that they have been involved is key though. It has been found to be an important element of the successful implementation of change by Rainey and Fernandez and others in studying change leadership. Although an army is different, the differences are not great enough to discount the perception that this generation felt, endorsed by significant statistical confidence, that they had no input or involvement whatsoever. However, the need to change was clear to many, and not just a result of financial drivers, but the operational environment as well. It was obvious that those interviewed had considered the operational environment and a discussion involving them and other cohorts would have been a useful source of information going forward for the Senior Leadership.

These are the future leaders of the British Army, and they overwhelmingly felt that they had no say in the future. They were not listened to, or perhaps were so passively but not actively. The effects of this were significant potentially. It undermined attempts to build internal support and internal resistance solidified. More importantly however, considering how critical it is to mission command and how the British Army doctrinally seeks to operate, trust was not evident. This key aspect, from the manner in which change was planned: limited to a small, exclusive group and very closely controlled, and the perception that the sample surveyed and interviewed felt that they had no input, suggests that trust was very limited both top down, and then subsequently from the bottom up. This is an area where significant improvement can be made, and has potentially adversely harmed the British Army's culture.

Summary

The quantitative research showed that the British Army exhibited many of the characteristics required for successful change according to the Rainey and Fernandez model and its determinants. The impact of the changes was perceived negatively across the board. However, the respondents nevertheless believed that there absolutely was a need to change. This dichotomy can be traced to several key factors that this research highlighted both in the survey and during the interview stage.

People did not feel involved in change, a statistically significant result from the survey, and perceived that they had no input. As some mentioned, there were several impediments for larger scale involvement. The timeframe was tight, and the culture of the Army is very much top down and driven by Senior Leadership. Nevertheless, in chapter 5 some measures to address this shortcoming are discussed.

Persuasive communication is vital, and although some felt it was coherent and as good as it possibly could have been, many felt it was not persuasively conducted by Senior Leadership. The interviewees readily acknowledged that they were a difficult audience; very questioning and as one comment on communication stated in the survey, there was “significant effort (excluding New Employment Model) but it has been in the face of a very cynical audience.”¹³⁵ This cynicism should come as no surprise to anyone who has served in the British Army. A constant refrain was the need for honesty; frank and open information and discussion. Although most appreciated that “Senior Leadership got it,” this feeling was undermined by two key aspects.¹³⁶

First, the plan for the Future Reserves and its perceived unrealistic goals and unproven nature have increased skepticism about the entire Army 2020 project. There has been great obfuscation in dealing with the how according to this group of majors and a lack of transparency. The perception was that there was a lack of the provision of a plan and vision to accompany this.

The lack of detail, in particular, about personnel policy change programs and their effect, has eroded trust to an extent and adversely affected the perception of moral leadership by senior officers. In particular, the changes to pensions were keenly felt as was the perceived lack of moral leadership in this program. Although realism pervades; “a line was drawn and some benefitted, others didn’t”¹³⁷ and the scheme is still very

¹³⁵ Quotes are from Qualitative Research on British Army Leadership, conducted 16–27 June 2014, Reviewed and approved by the CGSC Human Protections Administrator and Quality Assurance Office. The survey control number is 14-06-073.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

generous, this decrease in the offer and package coupled with the continued opaque nature of the New Employment Model has damaged the perception of change amongst the cohort.

Direct Leadership, day-to-day interaction, was cited by interviewees as not being as good as it should have been. This in turn undermined Senior Leadership direction and change leadership. Once again evidence of a lack of trust potentially in change and Senior Leadership, which arguably manifested itself from the top down once change had been imposed on Senior Leadership by political direction.

However, there was great appreciation that change was inevitable and some felt on balance that Senior Leadership did as best as they could, given the circumstances. This is exemplified by the redundancies. The redundancy plan's sequencing and effect on Army culture were negatively perceived, but the execution of the plan was, overall, viewed more positively than other programs. This is not to discount the areas highlighted above that could have been improved, but rather that any discussion on change must have this critical financial and political context.

The most troubling aspect of the research findings are with regard to the future. In particular, the culture of the Army going forward and the concerns of the interviewees about how the British Army is perceived internally and by the wider population. This reflected concerns over army recruiting, retention and the British Army's reputation.

This area will be discussed in chapter 5, along with areas for further research, the key conclusions, and lessons learned. However, in terms of the perception of majors on

the changes, and for a pithy synopsis, a combat officer in the survey probably best sums it up by stating: “It’s shit, but ultimately there was little choice.”¹³⁸

¹³⁸ Quote is from the Survey on British Army Leadership, conducted 16–27 June 2014, Reviewed and approved by the CGSC Human Protections Administrator and Quality Assurance Office. The survey control number is 14-06-073.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In chapter one, the research topic was introduced and why it is both relevant and important. In the following chapter, the vital context of change was discussed as well as key aspects of the transformation that formed the basis for the survey and interviews. The British Army's uniqueness was extrapolated and the civilian change model and its eight determinants used to analyze the changes over the last five years was described. Chapter three focused on the methodology of the research and its results were discussed in the previous chapter.

Overall, the changes were perceived negatively. However, when the quantitative research was transposed onto the eight determinants, it showed that the change over the last five years met some of key criteria required for leading successful change that Rainey and Fernandez identified. In addition, there was great acknowledgement of the situation and pressures which Senior Leadership faced in leading this imposed change, financial and political.

However, the clear dichotomy between the acceptance that there was a need for change and the negative perception of the changes themselves, illustrates that there were areas where change could have been led differently. This perception was reinforced in most cases by the qualitative interviews. There were areas where, although their impact was arguably always going to be perceived negatively, the implementation and how change was led was also perceived poorly. For example: Future Reserves, pensions and the New Employment Model. The perception of the redundancy program however,

demonstrates that a more positive response is possible, even in controversial circumstances.

The three key areas where improvement could be made in how Senior Leaders lead change stem from the perception that: the majors surveyed and interviewed had little to no input in change; the communication was not persuasive enough and that there was a lack of an explanation of the how. These three areas will now be discussed in turn, before looking at the perceived impact on British Army culture and finally, areas for further research.

Increasing Bottom-up Involvement in Change

Change requires buy-in from all participants and internal support to institutionalize change. The British Army, although a strong hierarchical organization, is not immune from this. The results from the survey and the interviews show that the vast majority did not feel any involvement in the process, which in turn led to a lack of internal support. With due acknowledgement of the time pressures and that change was imposed, it does point to the need organizationally to tap into the lower levels of the army in a far more pro-active fashion. Those who formed part of the research, with statistically significant backing, felt that they had no opportunity to make their views clear on change, let alone that they were heard, appreciated or ideas were even adopted. Hence the dichotomy between recognizing the need for change and the negative perception of change overall.

A sense of common goals, well recognized and debated would have many benefits. This is firmly the responsibility of Senior Leadership. The foremost benefit would be to build trust in the change. This in turn would help potentially mitigate some

of the poor practices of direct leadership highlighted in interviews and buy-in would greatly ease change and the image of the army internally and to the wider public. This should not be in the form of large roadshows or briefings or short, whistlestop visits by Senior Leadership, rather small groups focused and ready to discuss issues. They have an obligation to be there at the point of need.

An example of this is provided by the United States Army and their Project Solarium which brought captains together to discuss what they perceived to be the most important issues facing the United States Army in the future. As a result, a heavier emphasis on talent management ensued, and more importantly, anecdotally at least, many more realized that their views were being inputted into decision-making.¹³⁹ This project will continue. The British Army will soon be 82,000 strong, which should allow for greater adaptability and, most importantly, interaction between decision and policy makers at headquarters and those below.

Good ideas are not only the preserve of leaders, and feedback should be actively sought by Senior Leadership to make their leadership more effective. This should not be done by faceless statistical surveys, rather physically collecting views qualitatively, encouraging an open and candid dialogue. Which in turn, is directly linked to how change was communicated.

¹³⁹ Discussion by author on Project Solarium and with classmates at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2014. There is no statistical proof that this is the case, but a similar model is certainly worth attempting to implement in the UK.

Effective Senior Level Communication

A key part of improving bottom- up involvement is also the need for persuasive, consistent, high quality communication from Senior Leadership. There were some divergent views on how good the communication was during the transformation over the last five years. Nevertheless, the best practice cited was invariably when decisions were articulated clearly, honestly and directly by those in charge of leading change. Too often this was perceived to not have been the case. Better communication would mitigate the perception by some of those surveyed or interviewed that they were being messaged and not led. Change by imposition requires arguably even greater reliance upon Senior Leadership to articulate, explain and convey this to the rest of the organization.

The volume of information available and also the very staged manner in which all changes were articulated may have had the unintended consequence of actually undermining the message. Instead of comprehensive, inclusive and detailed communication, the changes were drip-fed over time which led many to possibly lose track or be unaware of what each change truly means. Rumour was also allowed to develop. The New Employment Model is an extremely good example. Everyone knows it exists and is happening. However, the majority of those surveyed and interviewed were unaware of what it truly means.

More should be done to effectively communicate change. Those responsible must be seen and heard across the British Army. Senior Leadership also embody change and must be wary of this as they communicate. The perception of a majority of those who had worked at Brigade, Division or Army Headquarters that Senior Leadership support for change was not evident throughout, undermines the change process. There are obvious

mitigations for this result, as discussed in chapter four, however, a single leader or group responsible for change, visible to the entire army could decrease this perception.

Furthermore, such is the emphasis and importance placed on communication in enacting all change, it must also be linked to the overall negative perception that the British Army's transformation had. The communication undermined the overall strategy or vision. If the communication was poor, then it is understandable that any plan, irrespective of its soundness, would be negatively perceived. As shown by the results in the survey, only the plan for redundancies was considered sound by a majority.

Provide the Plan

Complementing both these aspects was the perception that the *how* in the British Army's transformation was not provided. This was most frequently cited in interviews. The plan for the Future Reserves best exemplifies this, but Army 2020 was similar. Namely, that an outline or idea was promulgated with no firm supporting plan to achieve the endstate. Army 2020 because it was perceived to be more realistic and the cohort has witnessed the beginning of its implementation, was not as negatively thought of as Future Reserves. However, the latter was, overwhelmingly so, perceived to be unsound and negative. This is simply because the majority did not believe the plan would work, or how the endstate would be achieved. This raises the question whether Senior Leadership were honest in their appraisal and advice about what was achievable. Word needs to be matched with deed, and an army's can-do attitude may sometimes be harmful, which in turn affects trust from external stakeholders, chiefly political, and also internally when faced with an unrealistic plan.

This points to the need for comprehensive change to be accompanied by a detailed, realistic plan. Or, if this is not possible due to timing issues, or because the change is visionary in nature, then better communication of why this is the case and that the how is pending is a pre-requisite.

In addition, this should be accompanied by involvement of all levels of the army, bottom-up, in the communication, planning and enactment. These three elements are intrinsically linked and were largely responsible for the negative perception of change. However, other elements which contributed to the negative perception of change and how Senior British Army officers led change were identified during the research, and these are largely culture orientated.

Culture

The mere suggestion by some in the surveys and during interviews that Senior Leadership lacked moral courage or leadership during change was alarming. This was particularly evident in discussions on pensions. The stark contrast between generations and that over-45s would be exempt from change, due to understandable reasons such as leaving more senior members of the army with less time to prepare for retirement, left many disillusioned. Although as noted in the previous chapter, one interviewee mentioned that change had been done in as moral a fashion as possible, not setting and leading by example harmed the perception of change, and the effectiveness of Senior Leadership to lead it.

This ties in with accountability concerns raised in the qualitative research. The simple question is: what happens if a change program fails? Who will then be held responsible and what will be done. There is a perception that there is no accountability at

the highest level for the transformation which has occurred. This is certainly a product of the career path and postings procedure in the army. Nevertheless, perhaps with reference to a significant change program in the future, especially a strategic implementation such as Army 2020, a single high-ranking officer, or group (guiding coalition) could be given control and must lead the program right through to its conclusion. They would oversee the design, implementation and the institutionalization of change as far as possible. A holistic, continual approach. This would give change a face, build trust and also illustrate categorically that there is accountability at the highest level. It would be his or her responsibility to lead change with the ensuing rewards or consequences.

The timing of the change when the British Army's reputation was at a potential highpoint with the public after the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns was unfortunate. In addition, the public's understanding and appreciation of the army was also much improved. The British Army must continue to recruit and represent society. The perception of downsizing on this critical external stakeholder, the public, and the ability of the army to attract the right people was also a concern raised during research by this generation. Especially with regards to meeting the targets required for the Future Reserves program to work. Negative headlines and profound change affects the prestige of the British Army.

This is also an internal concern. For some, the plan for a significant majority of those serving to now be based permanently in the UK will be a retention tool and also a potential recruiting one. However, for many of this generation, this is yet another cultural change. The end of operations in Afghanistan, and uncertainty of what roles will follow has resulted in a change of mindset. This, however, is a case of wait out and see in many

ways. Defence engagement should bring opportunity and the army will invariably be used for something.

Areas for Further Research

The key area for further research is into the perceptions of other parts of the British Army on the changes. This could either endorse or controvert the views of majors surveyed and interviewed for this thesis. Therefore, adding weight to this project's findings, or more importantly identify potentially other areas where improvement could be made, or of good practice that should be replicated in the future.

The second area would be for research into the Senior Leaders' perception of changes and how they led them. This thesis focused solely on the perception of a select cohort. An in-depth study of Senior Leaderships' views would add important balance to the research.

Above all, however, this thesis raised interesting questions concerning the future of the British Army which were outside the parameters of the research. For example, the concerns raised in interviews on the culture and make-up of the British Army in the future and which are perhaps summed up best by two questions: What will the future attraction of the British Army be with the continued erosion of the "offer" to those serving and those the Army attempts to recruit? How will the British Army address the perceived erosion of the view that people are no longer most important resource? An in-depth study into the cultural dimension of change in the British Army and its affects would be useful for any future change program.

Finally, there is potential area sociologically for research. This stems from the fact that those interviewed and surveyed perceived that they had no involvement in change,

and felt arguably that they should. This perception and requirement may be part of wider societal trends in the United Kingdom. Therefore, does the British Army reflect societal realities appropriately in how it conducts its business?

Conclusion

In the last five years, the British Army has undergone a significant transformation. The overall perception of those surveyed and interviewed during this research was that change had been negative. In terms of the effectiveness of Senior Leadership, the programs have and will continue to be enacted, and will shape the British Army for the foreseeable future. These two statements could have been written at the outset. However, the most critical aim of this research, was to ask the so what and examine the changes in more detail and how they were perceived by this generation of majors. This is tremendously important. With rumours commencing already of further cuts next year with the 2015 *Strategic Defence and Security Review* due,¹⁴⁰ notwithstanding whether or not the cuts make any strategic sense, how will they be led if they materialise? This research has shown clear areas where improvement is possible, areas of good practice and also second- or even third-order effects of change which may not have been fully appreciated, such as cultural ones. Change has been a near constant in the British Army throughout its history, and it is certain that the British Army will continue to change. What will remain constant, however, is the enduring importance of all aspects of leadership in everything we do.

¹⁴⁰ Tom Ripley and Mark Hookham, "Treasury prepares fresh barrage of military cutbacks," *The Sunday Times*, 26 October 2014, accessed 27 October 2014, <http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/article1475828.ece>.

APPENDIX A

BRITISH ARMY LEADERSHIP SURVEY

This questionnaire asks about changes in the British Army over the last five years. Specifically, it asks about your perception of Senior British Leadership in leading this change; this is defined as at the 1* level and above.

The purpose of this study is to examine the role leadership played in the changes in the British Army over the last five years. It focuses on the perceptions of these changes amongst majors who promoted in 2012.

The research is being conducted as part of a Masters in Military Art and Science at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Participation is voluntary, and if you have any questions or concerns about this research, the point of contact regarding this study is:

Maria L. Clark, Ph.D.
Human Protections Administrator (HPA)
Lewis and Clark Building, Command and General Staff College

All answers are confidential and your name will not be used. The survey will take approximately 10 minutes to complete.

In addition to conducting a survey, I am also seeking volunteers to participate in one-on-one interviews to take a more in-depth look into the changes. The interviews will last no more than an hour and will be confidential. If you are interested, please contact me at the email address below or turn in your contact information to me separately.
gwmuir@gmail.com

This survey has been reviewed and approved by the CGSC Human Protections Administrator and Quality Assurance Office. The survey control number is 14-06-073

1. **A brief overview of your career:**

When joined: Branch of the Army(Cbt, CS, CSS):
Regiment: Operational Tours (number and place):

Any experience at Bde/ Division/ HQ Army(with brief description of your duties):

2. **What impact did the following 6 programmes have on the British Army?**
(Mark with X)

	Very Negative	Negative	No Impact	Positive	Very Positive
Pension					
Redundancies					
Future Reserves					
Move to 82,000					
Army 2020					
New Employment Model					

Please briefly explain the change you think has had the greatest impact (even if it is not listed above).

3. **There was a need to change the British Army (Please circle):**

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither disagree nor agree Agree
Strongly Agree

Please explain your answer:

4. **Overall, what has been the impact of the changes in the British Army in the last five years?**

Very Negative Negative No Impact Positive Very Positive

5. **The changes to the British Army have been beneficial:**

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither disagree nor agree Agree Strongly Agree

6. **How optimistic are you of the British Army's future?**

Not optimistic at all Somewhat optimistic Very optimistic

7. **How much power did Senior Army Leaders have in influencing the changes?**

No Power Very Little Power Some Power Moderate Power Great Deal of Power

Please explain your choice below:

8. **The Senior Army Leadership developed a sound course of action to implement these changes.**

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Pension					
Redundancies					
Future Reserves					
Move to 82,000					
Army 2020					
New Employment Model					

9. **The Senior Army Leadership persuasively communicated the changes.**

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither disagree nor agree Agree
Strongly Agree

Please explain your answer:

10. **Did you have any involvement in the change process/ help shape the changes taking place?**

Yes

No

11. **How adequate were these resources to support change?**

	Very Inadequate	Inadequate	Adequate	Very Adequate
Finance				
Time				
Manpower				

12. **Was Senior Army Leadership support for change evident throughout?**

Yes

No

13. **How well have the changes been incorporated in the British Army?**

Not very well
Very well

Fairly well

Moderately well

14. **Please provide comments regarding your experience with any of the changes asked about in this survey.**

APPENDIX B
SURVEY RESULTS

British Army Changes

(August 2014 Survey)


Summary Report

Tuesday, August 12, 2014

What branch of the Army do you belong to?

Response Rate: 90% (N=37) Question Type: Choose one


Combat	15
Combat Support	11
Combat Service Support	11
Total Responses	37



Are you a Direct Entry or Late Entry Officer?

Response Rate: 90% (N=37) Question Type: Choose one


Direct Entry	33
Late Entry	4
Total Responses	37



Have you ever worked at Bde, Div or HQ Level?

Response Rate: 90% (N=37) Question Type: Choose one


Yes	22
No	15
<hr/>	
Total Responses	37



What impact did Pensions have on the British Army?

Response Rate: 100% (N=41) Question Type: Choose one


Very Negative	9
Negative	30
No Impact	1
Positive	1
Very Postive	0
Total Responses	41



What impact did Redundancies have on the British Army?

Response Rate: 100% (N=41) Question Type: Choose one


Very Negative	9
Negative	27
No Impact	4
Positive	1
Very Postive	0
Total Responses	41



What impact did Future Reserves have on the British Army?

Response Rate: 100% (N=41) Question Type: Choose one


Very Negative	2
Negative	32
No Impact	3
Positive	4
Very Postive	0
Total Responses	41



What impact did Move to 82,000 have on the British Army?

Response Rate: 100% (N=41) Question Type: Choose one


Very Negative	3
Negative	33
No Impact	3
Positive	2
Very Postive	0
Total Responses	41



What impact did Army 2020 have on the British Army?

Response Rate: 100% (N=41) Question Type: Choose one


Very Negative	0
Negative	23
No Impact	6
Positive	12
Very Postive	0
Total Responses	41



What impact did New Employment Model have on the British Army?

Response Rate: 100% (N=41) Question Type: Choose one


Very Negative	7
Negative	16
No Impact	15
Positive	3
Very Postive	0
Total Responses	41



There was a need to change the British Army.

Response Rate: 100% (N=41) Question Type: Choose one


Strongly Disagree	0
Disagree	0
Neither Disagree or Agree	3
Agree	34
Strongly Agree	4
<hr/>	
Total Responses	41



Overall, what has been the impact of the changes in the British Army in the last five years?

Response Rate: 100% (N=41) Question Type: Choose one


Very Negative	3
Negative	33
No Impact	1
Positive	4
Very Positive	0
Total Responses	41



The changes to the British Army have been beneficial.

Response Rate: 100% (N=41) Question Type: Choose one


Strongly Disagree	0
Disagree	20
Neither Disagree or Agree	15
Agree	6
Strongly Agree	0
<hr/>	
Total Responses	41



How optimistic are you of the British Army's future?

Response Rate: 100% (N=41) Question Type: Choose one


Not Optimistic at All	9
Somewhat Optimistic	27
Very Optimistic	5
Total Responses	41



How much power did Senior Army Leaders have in influencing the changes?

Response Rate: 100% (N=41) Question Type: Choose one


No Power	1
Very Little Power	8
Some Power	15
Moderate Power	13
Great Deal of Power	4
Total Responses	41



The Senior Army Leadership developed a sound course of action to implement these changes: Pension.

Response Rate: 98% (N=40) Question Type: Choose one


Strongly Disagree	9
Disagree	10
Neither Agree or Disagree	10
Agree	11
Strongly Agree	0
Total Responses	40



The Senior Army Leadership developed a sound course of action to implement these changes: Redundancies.

Response Rate: 98% (N=40) Question Type: Choose one


Strongly Disagree	5
Disagree	9
Neither Agree or Disagree	5
Agree	19
Strongly Agree	2
Total Responses	40



The Senior Army Leadership developed a sound course of action to implement these changes: Future Reserves.

Response Rate: 98% (N=40) Question Type: Choose one


Strongly Disagree	12
Disagree	22
Neither Agree or Disagree	3
Agree	3
Strongly Agree	0
Total Responses	40



The Senior Army Leadership developed a sound course of action to implement these changes: Move to 82,000.

Response Rate: 98% (N=40) Question Type: Choose one


Strongly Disagree	2
Disagree	18
Neither Agree or Disagree	12
Agree	8
Strongly Agree	0
Total Responses	40



The Senior Army Leadership developed a sound course of action to implement these changes: Army 2020.

Response Rate: 98% (N=40) Question Type: Choose one


Strongly Disagree	2
Disagree	8
Neither Agree or Disagree	15
Agree	15
Strongly Agree	0
Total Responses	40



The Senior Army Leadership developed a sound course of action to implement these changes: New Employment Model.

Response Rate: 90% (N=37) Question Type: Choose one


Strongly Disagree	6
Disagree	12
Neither Agree or Disagree	16
Agree	2
Strongly Agree	1
Total Responses	37



The Senior Army Leadership persuasively communicated the changes.

Response Rate: 100% (N=41) Question Type: Choose one


Strongly Disagree	7
Disagree	21
Neither Disagree or Agree	6
Agree	7
Strongly Agree	0
<hr/>	
Total Responses	41



Did you have any involvement in the change process/
help shape the changes taking place?

Response Rate: 98% (N=40) Question Type: Choose one


Yes	3
No	37
<hr/>	
Total Responses	40



How adequate were these resources to support change: Finance?

Response Rate: 78% (N=32) Question Type: Choose one


Very Inadequate	8
Inadequate	13
Adequate	10
Very Adequate	1
<hr/>	
Total Responses	32



How adequate were these resources to support change: Time?

Response Rate: 80% (N=33) Question Type: Choose one


Very Inadequate	3
Inadequate	15
Adequate	15
Very Adequate	0
<hr/>	
Total Responses	33



How adequate were these resources to support change: Manpower?

Response Rate: 76% (N=31) Question Type: Choose one


Very Inadequate	6
Inadequate	13
Adequate	12
Very Adequate	0
<hr/>	
Total Responses	31



Was Senior Army Leadership support for change evident throughout?

Response Rate: 98% (N=40) Question Type: Choose one


No	20
Yes	20
<hr/>	
Total Responses	40



How well have the changes been incorporated in the British Army?

Response Rate: 95% (N=39) Question Type: Choose one

Not Very Well	8
Fairly Well	16
Moderately Well	13
Very Well	2
<hr/>	
Total Responses	39



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